DEFINING AND REGULATING HARDCORE
CARTELS IN HONG KONG: AGENCY
RECONCILING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN
LEGISLATORS AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
Sinchit Lai*
In 2012, Hong Kong passed the Competition Ordinance, the region’s
first cross-sector competition law. In the statute, the government introduced
a legal term called “Serious Anti-competitive Conduct” which includes four
conducts, namely price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid
rigging. At a glance, this legal term is very similar to another term called
“Hardcore Cartels” introduced by OECD in 1998. In fact, the two terms are
different because “Hardcore Cartels” includes only the four conducts formed
horizontally (e.g. between competitors) while “Serious Anti-Competitive
Conduct” includes the four conducts formed both horizontally and vertically
(e.g. between distributors and retailers). This created a divergence between
the international standard and Hong Kong legislators. Based on the
definition of “Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct,” Hong Kong legislators
formed a dual-track system by imposing differentiable statutory regulations
to conducts that the legislators believed to be more and less serious.
Thereafter, the local law enforcement agency created two more terms known
as “Cartel Conduct” and “The Four Don’ts” based off the statute. This is
identified as an attempt of the agency to reconcile the divergence. After
reviewing the legislation history, this Comment suggested that the
divergence was formed by ignorance when the Hong Kong government
proposed to the legislators to introduce the term “Serious Anti-Competitive
Conduct” in the statute in response to the concern of SMEs. Furthermore,
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this Comment analyzes the divergence based on rule of evidence developed
in the U.S. judicial experience and suggests that the divergence is unjustified.
Also, this Comment points out the limitations of the agency’s attempt to
reconcile the divergence. This Comment concludes that the divergence and
reconciliation all together unintendedly created more legal uncertainties and
discouraged companies to form some agreements that may induce net procompetitive effects. Thus, this Comment urges for amending the definition
of “Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct” in Hong Kong’s Competition
Ordinance.
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INTRODUCTION
In the field of antitrust, there are different kinds of anti-competitive
behaviors. Among all these behaviors, which are the most severe ones?
Internationally, there is a general consent – “hardcore cartels.”1 The term
hard “core cartels” was first introduced by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1998.2 Although collusions in
the form of hardcore cartels have existed long before the term was created,
the terminology itself is relatively new. Over the last two decades, there has
been growing acceptance and application of such terminology. For example,
“hardcore cartels” started to appear in government officials’ speeches and
legal documents in some countries.3 In addition, the terminology has
regulatory implications to some countries.4 In 2012, Hong Kong passed the
Competition Ordinance (hereinafter the Ordinance)5 – the region’s first
cross-sector competition law.6 This marked the breakthrough of the
application of the term “hardcore cartels” as the ordinance included a legal
term called “serious anti-competitive conduct,” which at a glance is very
similar to “hardcore cartels.”7 The introduction of such definition in the
statute is significant because it enabled the Hong Kong government and
legislators to further develop a dual-track system in the Ordinance with
innovative mechanisms during the legislative process.8 However, upon a
closer look, the definition of “serious anti-competitive conduct” introduced
by Hong Kong legislators is different from “hardcore cartels” as recognized

1. Infra Section I.
2. ORGANISATION

FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [OECD],
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE
CARTELS [C(98)35/FINAL] (1998), https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2350130.pdf.
3. See James M. Griffin, Dep’t of Justice, Address before American Bar Association
Section of Antitrust Law 48th Annual Spring Meeting at Washington D.C. (Apr. 6, 2000)
(“Rather, the cartels that we have prosecuted criminally have invariably involved hardcore
cartel activity—price fixing, bid-rigging, and market- and customer-allocation agreements);
see also European Commission Memoranda, infra note 80 (utilizing the term hardcore cartel
in a European Commission press release).
4. Infra Section I(C).
5. Competition
Ordinance,
(2018)
Cap.
619,
1-2,
§1
(H.K.),
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap619!en-zh-Hant-HK@2018-0420T00:00:00.assist.pdf?FILENAME=Assisted%20Bilingual%20PDF%20(English%20and
%20Traditional%20Chinese).pdf&DOC_TYPE=G&PUBLISHED=true.
6. Neil Carabine & James Wilkinson, Hong Kong’s New Competition Law Takes Effect
– Are You Compliant?, 5 HONG KONG LAWYER (2016), http://www.hklawyer.org/content/hong-kong%E2%80%99s-new-competition-law-takes-effect%E2%80%93-are-you-compliant.
7. Infra Section II(A).
8. Infra Section II(C).
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internationally.9 Furthermore, after the Ordinance was passed, the law
enforcement agency in Hong Kong, the Competition Commission,
introduced terminologies such as “Cartel Conduct” in its guideline and “the
four don’ts” in its publications.10 These two terms have a definition different
from “serious anti-competitive conduct,” but the same as “hardcore
cartels.”11 This could be viewed as an example of a law enforcement agency
exercising its discretion to reconcile the divergence between the legislator
and international standard.12
After Hong Kong passed the Ordinance in 2012, some scholars have
written about the regulation of cartels in Hong Kong..13 Moreover, some
studies reviewed the ordinance on a more macro scale and briefly touched
on the “serious anti-competitive conduct.”14 Most recently, there was a
comparative study published about the regulation of distribution agreements
(i.e. vertical agreements formed between manufacturers and distributors),
between China and Hong Kong. This study involves analysis on the
regulation of retail price maintenance, a form of vertical price-fixing
agreements in Hong Kong.15
Distinct from the above studies, this Comment addresses: (1) What and
why is there a divergence between the international standard and Hong Kong
legislators (Section I & II); (2) Is such divergence justifiable based on the
U.S. experience In other words, is “serious anti-competitive” a better
definition of severe anti-competitive behaviors than “hardcore cartels” from
the U.S. view point (Section III); and (3) How did the law enforcement
agency in Hong Kong reconcile the divergence (Section VI) and what are the
limitations and implications of the reconciliation (Section V).

9. Infra Section II(A).
10. Infra Section IV(A)&(B).
11. Id.
12. Infra Section IV(C).
13. See Sandra M. Colino, Sanctions for Cartel Conduct in Hong Kong: Past and
Present, CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE (Sept. 30, 2015) (examining the penalties available under
the Ordinance); Sandra M. Colino, Punishing Cartel Behavior: Means to Encourage
Compliance with the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance, in CARTELS IN ASIA: LAW &
PRACTICE 315 (Thomas Cheng et al. ed., 2015) (assessing the suitability of punishments under
the Ordinance as an effective deterrence to anti-competitive behavior).
14. See, e.g., Kelvin H. Kwok, The New Hong Kong Competition Law: Anomalies and
Challenges, 37 WORLD COMPETITION. L. & ECON. REV. 541, 544 (2014) (discussing the
implications of restricting serious anti-competitive conduct); Knut Fournier, The New Hong
Kong Competition Law in Domestic and Global Context 16 (Dec. 24, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2193490 (noting that certain undertakings must not
entail such conduct).
15. Sandra M. Colino, Distribution Agreements under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and
the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance, 1 CHINA ANTITRUST L.J. (2017).
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INTERNATIONAL STANDARD: “HARDCORE CARTELS” AS THE
MOST SEVERE ANTI-COMPETITIVE BEHAVIORS

A. Definition
What are “hardcore cartels”? To answer this question, we must first
understand what a “cartel” is. Ordinarily, in markets with multiple
companies, individual companies need to compete against each other for
more profit. At the same time, these independent companies understand that
competition will impose pressure on them to reduce prices, and hence reduce
profits. Therefore, two or more competing companies may form agreements
to act collectively and restrain competition to raise profit.16 Under such
setting, either the combination of firms, the agreement or the collective
conduct could be named as a “cartel.”17 Since cartels only exist between
competing firms, the term is also used as a synonym of “horizontal
agreement” in the area of antitrust.18 Having said that, “cartel” is not typical
legal terminology, as many countries did not include and define it in their
statutes.19
Based on the above definition of “cartel,” there was the introduction of
a distinct and narrower concept – “hardcore cartels” - by the OECD Council
in the Recommendation of the council concerning Effective Action against
Hardcore Cartels adopted in 1998.20 As defined in the Recommendation by
the Council, a “hardcore cartel” is: “an anticompetitive agreement,
anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by
competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish
output restrictions or quotas, or share or divide markets by allocating
customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce.”21
16. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 523 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1945) (explaining the US attorney’s suggested definition for the term “cartel”); Keith N.
Hylton, Cartels, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 68
(2003) (describing how forming agreements to restrict price, output, and competition is cartel
behavior).
17. National Lead Co., supra note 16, at 523 n.5.
18. See, e.g., Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, Sustainable Development in the
Negotiation of the FTAA, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1118, 1198 (2003) (analyzing the global
adoption of competition laws, including prohibitions on horizontal restraints); Thomas
Cottier, BOOK REVIEW: Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting
Prometheus, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 187, 188 (2000) (discussing a history of the prohibition of
horizontal agreements); Xiaoye Wang, Issue Surrounding the Drafting of China’s AntiMonopoly Law, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 285, 286 (2004) (distinguishing between
horizontal and vertical agreements).
19. Infra Section I.
20. OECD, supra note 2.
21. OECD, supra note 2, at 3.
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Simply speaking, the four hardcore cartels are price fixing, output
restrictions, market allocation and bid rigging as OECD has listed on its
website.22 As explicitly defined, the four hardcore cartels are only limited to
“arrangement by competitors.”23 Thus, more precisely, the four hardcore
cartels are horizontal price fixing, horizontal output restrictions, horizontal
market allocation and horizontal bid rigging.
B. Seriousness
In the Recommendation, the Council urged governments of its member
countries to make sure that their competition laws could effectively combat
hardcore cartels and cooperate in fighting against such cartels.24 Among all
different cartels, why did the Council categorize the above four conducts
only and recommend its member countries to focus on prohibiting them?
One of the reasons is that the Council considered the seriousness of hardcore
cartels.25 As described in the Recommendation by the Council, hardcore
cartels are “the most egregious violations of competition law” which reduces
output and increases the price of goods and services in many countries.26
However, one may not be satisfied that OECD has simply used the adverse
output and price effect to justify hardcore cartels as the most serious
violations of competition law. The same adverse effects could apply to nonhardcore cartels as well (i.e. cartels that don’t fall into the above four
categories).
In order to verify OECD’s claim, the author has provided a justification
based on the U.S. judicial experience below. As one of the fundamental
principles in the U.S. antitrust law, the “rule of reason” (RoR) was first
introduced in the dissent of United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n27
in 1897, adopted in Standard Oil Co. v. United States28 in 1911, and further
elaborated on in Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States29 in 1918.30 The
philosophy behind the RoR is that although anti-competitive effect is found
from an agreement, it is not prohibited if it also generates pro-competitive
effect that will outweigh its anti-competitive effect.31 In practice, the court
22. Council of OECD, Cartels and anti-competitive agreements, OECD (Jun. 1, 2017),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/.
23. OECD, supra note 2, at 3.
24. OECD, supra note 2, at 2-3.
25. OECD, supra note 2, at 2.
26. Id.
27. 166 U.S. 290, 343-374 (1897).
28. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
29. U.S. 231 (1918).
30. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 102-104 (3d ed. 2017).
31. Id. at 102-104; In Bd. of Trade of Chicago (1918), the court held that, “The true test
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would adopt a “reasonableness test” to evaluate the anti-competitive and procompetitive evidence submitted by the plaintiff and defendant respectively.
If evidence presented demonstrates that the anti-competitive effect of the
challenged conduct outweighs its pro-competitive effect, then the conduct
would be conceived as an unreasonable restraint of trade that violates section
1 of the Sherman Act.32 As one could imagine, it is costly to adopt a
reasonableness test since it takes time and money for both the plaintiff and
defendant to prepare evidence and for courts to analyze them. Following the
development of the RoR in the cases mentioned above, the “per se rule”
began to take shape in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.33 in 1927 and
became well-settled in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.34 in 1940.35
In contrast to the reasonableness test, the per se rule presumes certain
categories of conduct would unreasonably restrain trade. In other words,
once the court has found that a challenged conduct falls into a recognized
per se illegal category (e.g. price fixing or market division), a defendant’s
attempt to submit evidence to demonstrate “reasonableness” is precluded.36
So, how did U.S. courts decide whether a particular category of conduct
should be recognized as a per se violation? The simple answer is the judicial
experience developed over years. As well described by the court in United
States v. Topco Assocs. in 1972, “[i]t is only after considerable experience
with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se
violations of the Sherman Act.”37 In other words, if a category of conduct
has been repeatedly conceived by the court as an unreasonable restraint of
trade under the reasonableness test, the court would be confident enough to
classify such conduct as a per se violation. One key benefit of having a
bright line per se rule is to reduce, if not eliminate, the aforesaid cost to
prepare evidence and conduct evaluation. Noteworthy is the fact that per se
rule is not a distinct rule from the RoR.38 Instead, the per se rule falls on one
end of the RoR continuum which flows to the “full (comprehensive) RoR”
on the other end, with “quick look RoR” lying in-between.39 Further down
the road, National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States40 in
of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”
Bd. of Trade of Chicago, supra note 29 at 238.
32. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 246-248.
33. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
34. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
35. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 111.
36. Id. at 181.
37. 405 U.S. 596, 607-608 (1972).
38. ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 248.
39. Id.
40. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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1978 and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.41 in
1979 set forth the modern analytical framework of the rules.42 To some
extent, since Broadcast Music, Inc., the per se rule became less bright line
then before. For instance, this was at first sight a price fixing case which fell
into one of the per se illegal categories. However, the court refused to apply
the per se rule since the challenged conduct was not a “naked [restraint] of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition”.43 Although courts no
longer mechanically determine whether a challenged conduct falls within or
outside a per se illegal category, the fundamental rationale to trigger the per
se rule remained unchanged at least until 1998 when OECD introduced the
definition of hardcore cartels. For example, in Diaz v. Farley decided in
1998, the lower court quoted and followed a Supreme Court decision made
a decade ago that:
Certain categories of agreements. . .have been held to be per se
illegal, dispensing with the need for case-by-case evaluation. We
have said that per se rules are appropriate only for ‘conduct that is
manifestly anticompetitive,’. . .that is, conduct ‘that would always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease
output[.]’44
From the above, we could infer that when a conduct was analyzed by a
U.S. court under the per se rule, the conduct was considered as a more serious
violation of antitrust law in the state or country. Again, it was because (1)
the anti-competitive effect was certain for conducts that applied the per se
rule (but not to the conducts that applied the full RoR) and (2) the court was
confident that the anti-competitive effect of conducts that applied the per se
rule almost always outweighed its pro-competitive effect, if any. Keeping
this in mind, the author reviewed U.S courts’ opinions on the four types of
horizontal agreements within 15 years prior to 1998, when the definition of
hardcore cartels was introduced, to determine whether the U.S. shared
OECD’s view that hardcore cartels are more, if not the most, egregious
violations of competition law.
1. Horizontal Price Fixing or Output Restriction
First, regarding U.S. court’s attitude towards horizontal price fixing or
output restrictions, the author refers to Supreme Court’s opinion over
National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents decided in 1984.45
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

441 U.S. 1 (1979).
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., supra note 30, at 124.
Id. at 19.
15 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1143 (D. Utah 1998).
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) was an association
formed by many universities for the sake of regulating collegiate sports.46
The NCAA allowed two carrying networks, American Broadcasting Cos.
(ABC) and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), to show a certain number
of games and restrained how many times a team could be shown, at a
minimum aggregate price (i.e. output restrictions and price fixing
respectively).47 Schools were not allowed to negotiate with the networks.48
Thus, when some schools formed the College Football Association (CFA) to
show more games, the NCAA threatened to punish them by not showing
their games (not only football, but all other sports).49 The University of
Oklahoma then sued the NCAA and alleged that the NCAA restrained
televised football and violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.50 The court
affirmed that “Horizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily
condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach because the
probability that these practices are anti-competitive is so high.”51 However,
the court refused to apply the per se rule in this case because it acknowledged
that this was a case involving the sports industry. The court believed that in
order for league sports to exist, there must be some sort of horizontal
agreements.52 Instead, the court applied the RoR.53 Although the court
adopted such a rule that is far more favorable to the defendant, the court did
not abandon the apparentness of the anti-competitive effect of the challenged
conduct.54 Furthermore, the court decided that the pro-competitive effects of
the challenged conduct suggested by the defendant could not justify the
restraint of trade, thus failed the RoR and violated the law.55 From the above,
we could tell that U.S. courts did believe that price fixing and output
restrictions are more serious anti-competitive conducts. First, these conducts
ordinarily fall into the per se illegal categories. Second, even under a rare
situation like the NCAA, that involved the sports industry and RoR was
applied, both conducts could not be justified. Noteworthy is the fact that
price fixing and output restrictions are two different types of conduct. The
existence of either of them could trigger the per se rule. For example, as a
lower court stated a few years later, the “NCAA indicates that horizontal
output restrictions, even if unaccompanied by price fixing, should ordinarily
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 91-94.
Id.
Id. at 94-95.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 100.
Id. at 100-102.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 113-120.
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be declared per se illegal.”56
2. Horizontal Market Allocation
Second, regarding U.S. court’s attitude towards horizontal market
allocation, the author refers to Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc. decided in
1990.57 BRG of Georgia, Inc. (BRG) and Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal
and Professional Publications (HBJ) are two bar review companies.58 They
entered into an agreement whereby HBJ would not do business in Georgia
and BRG would not do business outside Georgia.59 Immediately after the
agreement, HBJ ceased its operations in Georgia and BRG increased the
price of its course from $150 to over $400.60 Petitioners, law school
graduates who contracted to take BRG’s course, alleged the agreement
between the two bar review companies violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act.61 The court identified the agreement as one that allocated territories
between competitors (i.e. horizontal market allocation) and held that it was
unlawful on its face by quoting United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.62 as
follows:
One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is an
agreement between competitors at the same level of the market
structure to allocate territories in order to minimize
competition . . . . This Court has reiterated time and time again
that ‘[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked restraints of
trade with no purpose except stifling of competition.’ Such
limitations are per se violations of the Sherman Act.63
Similar to price fixing and output restriction, the court classified market
allocation as one of the per se illegal categories. In general, it is believed
that market allocation has more anti-competitive effect than price fixing. It
is because under a price fixing agreement, conspirators could still compete
against each other in terms of quality of the goods or services. However,
with market allocation, conspirators would not even have pressure to engage
in non-price related competition.64
56. R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 11681,
at *12 (9th Cir. 1987).
57. 498 U.S. 46 (1990).
58. Id. at 47.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 46-47.
62. Topco Associates, supra note 37, at 608.
63. Palmer, supra note 57, at 49.
64. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 237 (5th
ed. 2004).

2018]

DEFINING AND REGULATING HARDCORE CARTELS

943

3. Horizontal Bid Rigging
Last, regarding the U.S. court’s attitude towards horizontal bid rigging,
the author refers to United States v. Cinemette Corp. of America decided in
1988.65 Between 1985 and 1986 at Altoona, a city in Pennsylvania, movie
exhibitors needed to compete for a license to show a film by submitting a bid
to a distributor on a movie-by-movie and theatre-by-theatre basis.66 Therein,
three theater operators, including Cinemette Corporation of America
(Cinemette), entered into a “split agreement.”67 Under the agreement,
exhibitors would allocate among themselves films offered by a distributor
and refrain from competing with each other.68 Hypothetically, a distributor
asked exhibitors to submit bids to compete for the right to show a movie
called “ABC.” Then all exhibitors might secretly agree Cinemette was the
winning exhibitor and will show this film. To do so, except for Cinemette,
all exhibitors would not submit a bid to the distributor. Without competition,
the distributor would have no choice but to name Cinemette the winner even
though Cinemette’s bid might be less favorable than what the distributor had
expected from a genuine competitive process. The court recognized the split
agreement as a bid rigging agreement that fell within the per se illegal
category as follows: “An agreement between competitors pursuant to which
contract offers are to be submitted to or withheld from a third party
constitutes bid rigging . . . and bid rigging repeatedly has been held to be a
per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, as a type of price fixing.”69
In practice, bid rigging exists in different forms. Based on the facts in
this case, we could see that the court was right, and the split agreement was
indeed a specific form of bid rigging known as bid suppression.70
The cases above reveal that, prior to OECD introducing the term
hardcore cartels, the four conducts (horizontal price fixing, output restriction,
market allocation and bid rigging) were classified as per se illegal in the U.S.
judicial system. It is hard to tell whether the four conducts are more severe
than those conducts that fell into the per se illegal category.71 However, there
is no doubt that the four conducts stood out from other cartels that were
usually treated under the RoR. Thus, OECD’s claim that hardcore cartels
65. 687 F. Supp. 976 (1988).
66. Id. at 977.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 977-978.
69. Id. at 979.
70. OECD, GUIDELINES FOR FIGHTING BID RIGGING IN PUBLIC PROCUREMENT 1–3 (2009),
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/42851044.pdf.
71. In 1998, as recognized by courts, conducts such as tying arrangements and horizontal
refusals to deal also fell into the per se illegal category. See Diaz v. Farley, 15 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1144 (D. Utah 1998). (providing examples of conduct treated with per se analysis).
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are the most serious violation of competition law is partially justified.
C. Regulation
As said, in 1998, OECD adopted the Recommendation of the Council
Concerning Effective Action Against Hardcore Cartels in which it
introduced the term hardcore cartels and urged its member countries to make
sure that their competition laws could effectively combat hardcore cartels
and cooperate in fighting against such cartels. Thereafter, OECD’s
Competition Committee spent a lot of effort in implementing the
Recommendation and submitted reports to the OECD in 2000, 2002 and 2005
regarding its work done and the progress of its member countries in fighting
against hardcore cartels.72 In light of the seriousness of hardcore cartels and
the effort of the Competition Committee, many countries have strengthened
the combat against them.73 However, “hardcore cartels” itself is not adopted
as a legal terminology. For example, in the fundamental statutory
competition law of Australia, Canada, China, European Union, Singapore,
United Kingdom and United States (in alphabetical order), there is not a legal
term created to clearly define and cover only the four hardcore cartels.74 That
said, except for the U.S., all the above countries or intergovernmental
organizations do enumerate some, if not all, of the four conducts in their

72. OECD, HARD CORE CARTELS: THIRD REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1998
COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION 7-8 (2005), https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/
35863307.pdf.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Australia – Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00062; Canada - Competition Act, R.S.C.
1985, c. C-34 (Can.), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-34/index.html; China Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduanfa (中华人民共和国反垄断法) [AntiMonopoly
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in Lawinfochina,
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=0&CGid=96789; European Union Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101-109,
Jun.
7,
2016,
2016
O.J.
(C
202)
88,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2016:202:FULL&from=EN; Council Regulation (EC) No.
1/2003 of 16 December 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=EN; Singapore – Competition Act,
c. 50B http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/download/0/0/pdf/binaryFile/pdfFile.pdf?CompId
:a5c81af7-2538-4a5e-b06f-63d6ee459b0a; United Kingdom – Competition Act, 1998, c. 41
(U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/41; Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40 (U.K.),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/40/contents; United States - Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1914) ;
The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1914); Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1936) (listing fundamental competition laws of different countries).
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statute as agreements that would violate the law.75 76 Noteworthy is the fact
that among these countries or intergovernmental organizations, the United
Kingdom and Australia have used “cartel provisions” and “cartel offence”
respectively as the titles of the sections that enumerate illegal conducts.77
Taking United Kingdom as an example, its cartel offence covers only the
four hardcore cartels. Having said that, the law does not define cartel as a
legal terminology, such as the law does not use cartel as a noun elsewhere in
the law. Although no country has adopted “hardcore cartels” as a legal
terminology in its statute, many have taken stronger measures in different
ways to combat the four hardcore cartel conducts. Following are five
examples: (i) in terms of evidence, as discussed, the U.S. has applied the
less defendant-favorable per se rule to hardcore cartel conducts and the more
defendant-favorable full RoR to other cartels; (ii) in terms of commitment,
the European Union established the Commitment Decisions system under
article nine of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003.78 Simply speaking, such
a system allows the suspected company to make a promise (i.e.,
commitment) to the European Commission in exchange for not receiving an
infringement decision.79 According to a memo issued in 2004 by the
European Commission, hardcore cartels are clearly excluded from the
privilege of the above commitment procedures.80 The memo did not clarify
the definition of hardcore cartels. Yet, in a document the European
Community (EC) submitted to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
75. See, e.g., Australia – Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) s 44ZZRD (Austl.);
Canada - Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34, art. 45 & 47 (Can.); European Union Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Jun.
7, 2016, 2016 O.J. (C 202) 88; Singapore – Competition Act, chapter 50B (enacted 2004,
revised Jan. 31, 2006, consolidated informally Jan. 22, 2016), section 34; United Kingdom –
Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 188 (U.K.).
76. For example, China is one of the countries that enumerated some, but not all of the
hard core cartels in its statute. More specifically, China enumerated horizontal price fixing,
output restrictions and market allocations, but not bid rigging under Article 13 of its AntiMonopoly Law. In a separated study, the author argued that China should add bid rigging as
one of the enumerations under the article. Sinchit Lai, Note, Bid Rigging, a Faintly
Discernible Enumeration under Article 13 of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China, 12 U. PA.
ASIAN L. REV. 244 (2016).
77. Australia - Competition Act, supra note 74, at s 44ZZRD; United Kingdom Competition Act, supra note 74, at § 188.
78. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, art. 9, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1,
9, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from
=EN.
79. EUR. COMM’N, Antitrust: commitment decisions – frequently asked questions,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-189_en.htm (last visited July 7, 2017).
80. European Commission Memoranda MEMO/04/217, Commitment decisions (Article
9 of Council Regulation 1/2003 providing for a modernised framework for antitrust scrutiny
of company behaviour) (Sept. 17, 2004), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-04217_en.htm?locale=en.
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2002, the EC clearly expressed that they referred to hardcore cartels as
organizations that engaged in price fixing, output restriction, market
allocation and bid rigging between competitors.81 Such interpretation was in
line with OECD’s definition; (iii) in terms of exclusion, Singapore has
presumed that “small or medium enterprises” with a market share below a
certain threshold, aggregately or separately, have no appreciable adverse
effect on competition even if they formed anti-competitive agreements.82
Thus, these small or medium enterprises are excluded from section thirtyfour of the country’s Competition Law that, similar to section one of the
Sherman Act in the U.S., prohibits anti-competitive agreements.83 However,
the above exclusion does not apply to restrictions placed on “hardcore”
entities involving horizontal price fixing, output restriction, market
allocation and bid rigging;84 (iv) in terms of sanctions, personnel of
undertakings that engaged in hardcore cartels may be subject to criminal
punishment in some countries, such as the United Kingdom.85 An example
is the marine hose case decided in 2008, in which the three natural-person
defendants were sentenced to jail for two and a half years;86 (v) in terms of
law enforcement, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
has long had a specialized criminal enforcement team separate from the civil
enforcement team which focuses merely on “hardcore” violations like price
fixing, market allocation and bid rigging.87
Overall, there are three takeaways from this section. First, it establishes
that “hardcore cartels” is a distinct concept from a cartel. Under the
definition of cartel, “hardcore cartels” is a narrower concept that covers only
four specific types of conduct. Second, hardcore cartels are distinguished
from cartels by the OECD for a good reason. One of the key reasons is that,
in 1998, the OECD acknowledged that the four conducts were more serious
than the remaining cartels. Third, although “hardcore cartels” is not adopted
81. EUR. COMM’N, International Hard Core Cartels and Cooperation Under a WTO
Framework Agreement on Competition, Submission for the WTO Working Group on the
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) 1 (June 24, 2002),
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/april/tradoc_111260.pdf.
82. COMPETITION COMM’N OF SINGAPORE [CCS], COMPETITION COMMISSION OF
SINGAPORE GUIDELINES ON
THE
MAJOR PROVISIONS 2016
8
(2016),
https://www.ccs.gov.sg/~/media/custom/ccs/files/legislation/ccs%20guidelines/e%20gazette
%205pm/guidelines%20on%20the%20major%20provisions%202016.ashx.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 8-9.
85. Enterprise Act, 2002, c. 40, § 190 (U.K.).
86. R v. Whittle, Allison, and Brammar [2008] EWCA Crim. 2560, [2009] Lloyd’s Rep.
FC 77, available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2008/2560.html.
87. Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Address at the Cartel Conference Budapest (Feb. 16, 2007) (transcript
available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/519316/download).
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as a legal terminology in different countries’ antitrust statutes, the creation
of the term itself has profound policy implications. As discussed, many
countries have introduced procedures that apply only to hardcore cartels, but
not to other cartels. Again, these “special treatments” can be justified by the
seriousness of hardcore cartels.
II.

DIVERGENCE: “SERIOUS ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT”
FORMED IN THE ORDINANCE BY HK LEGISLATORS

A. Definition
Unlike many other countries, Hong Kong “tried” to differentiate
hardcore cartels from other cartels by defining a legal terminology, namely
“serious anti-competitive conduct,” in its Competition Ordinance, the
region’s first cross-sector competition law passed by the Legislative Council
on June 14, 2012.88 This made it the first jurisdiction to make such an
attempt. However, such attempt was not fully successful because the
definition of “serious anti-competitive conduct” diverged from that of
“hardcore cartels,” which is widely accepted internationally.
In line with many other countries, prohibiting anti-competitive
agreements is one of the important pillars in Hong Kong’s Ordinance.
Sections six to eight of the Ordinance, also known as the First Conduct Rule,
is dedicated to defining what agreements are prohibited.89 Section six
provides a general definition of anti-competitive agreements that are illegal
but does not enumerate any conduct as an example. Simply speaking, the
Ordinance prohibits agreements with an object or effect to prevent, restrict
or distort competition in Hong Kong.90 Thereafter, section seven defines
“object” and “effect” and section eight describes the jurisdiction of the Fist
Conduct Rule geographically.91
88. Competition Ordinance, supra note 5, at §2.
89. Id. at §§ 6-8.
90. Section 6(1) of the Competition Ordinance prohibits anti-competitive “agreements,
concerted practices and decisions” as follows: (1) An undertaking must not — (a) make or
give effect to an agreement; (b) engage in a concerted practice; or (c) as a member of an
association of undertakings, make or give effect to a decision of the association, if the object
or effect of the agreement, concerted practice, or decision is to prevent, restrict or distort
competition in Hong Kong.
In this Comment, the word “agreements” is used generally for “agreements,”
“concerted practices” and “decisions.” Competition Ordinance, supra note 5, at § 6. Section
2 of the Competition Ordinance defined “undertaking” as: “any entity, regardless of its legal
status or the way in which it is financed, engaged in economic activity, and includes a natural
person engaged in economic activity.” Id. at § 6. In this Comment, words like “corporation”
and “company” are used instead of “undertaking” to make it easier for the reader to read.
91. Id. at §§ 7-8.
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On top of the above, the Ordinance defines “serious anti-competitive
conduct”. Section two of the Ordinance interprets different terminologies
used in the law. One of the terms defined is “serious anti-competitive
conduct,” which:
means any conduct that consists of any of the following or any
combination of the following— (a) fixing, maintaining, increasing
or controlling the price for the supply of goods or services; (b)
allocating sales, territories, customers or markets for the
production or supply of goods or services; (c) fixing, maintaining,
controlling, preventing, limiting or eliminating the production or
supply of goods or services; (d) bid rigging.92
At a glance, “serious anti-competitive conduct” is very similar to
“hardcore cartels” defined by OECD because both of them have enumerated
the four conducts, namely price fixing, output restriction, market allocation
and bid rigging. However, on a closer look, one would notice that the
definition of “serious anti-competitive conduct” created by Hong Kong
legislators is indeed different from “hardcore cartels” as recognized
internationally. On one hand, as defined, hardcore cartels refer only to the
four agreements made between competitors. Therefore, hardcore cartels are
limited to horizontal price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and
bid rigging. On the other hand, serious anti-competitive conduct covers “any
conduct”, as described in the ordinance, that consists of the four conducts.
In other words, it implies that serious anti-competitive conduct covers not
only horizontal, but also vertical price fixing, output restriction, market
allocation and bid rigging. Different from horizontal agreements that
represent agreements between competitors on the same level of the supply
chain, vertical agreements are agreements formed between firms at different
levels of the supply chain (e.g., between a manufacturer and retailer of a
certain good).93 In short, serious anti-competitive conduct, as introduced in
Hong Kong, is a broader definition than hardcore cartels. Compared to
hardcore cartels, the former includes four more conducts that are vertical
price fixing, vertical output restriction, vertical market allocation and vertical
bid rigging. Such difference is what the author noted as the divergence
between the Hong Kong legislators’ view and the definition accepted by the
international standard.
For instance, the label of “serious anti-competitive conduct” has a
strong signaling effect to the general public. Recall that one of the key
reasons for why the concept of hardcore cartels stands out from cartels is its
seriousness. Therefore, the terminology used by Hong Kong is literally
92. Id. at § 2.
93. ERNEST GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 64, at 333.
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much more precise and concise than “hardcore cartels” used by OECD or
“cartel” used by countries like the United Kingdom. Even laymen who have
never studied antitrust law could easily understand the harmful nature of the
four conducts. The author could imagine that, after reading section two of
the Ordinance, which includes the definition of serious anti-competitive
conduct, companies would feel reluctant to enter into any of the four
agreements enumerated without consulting counsel. Would defining serious
anti-competitive conduct in the statute provide more legal certainty to the
public? Surprisingly, the answer is – it depends. Indeed, the term “serious
anti-competitive conduct” has a strong signaling effect. However, if the
terminology itself doesn’t match its content, confusion instead of clarity will
result. In other words, if the four vertical agreements (i.e., the divergence)
do not seriously restrain competition in general, then the term “serious anticompetitive conduct” is misleading to the public. Thus, the next Section of
this Comment will analyze whether the divergence is indeed seriously anticompetitive.
B. Regulation
Similar to other countries, Hong Kong’s Competition Ordinance
adopted a dual-track system which provides relatively harsher procedures for
serious anti-competitive conduct compared to all other anti-competitive
agreements that would violate the First Conduct Rule. More precisely, there
are two sets of special procedures the Ordinance introduced to combat
serious anti-competitive conduct. Before introducing these measures, the
author would like to highlight another breakthrough of the Ordinance. Recall
that the United Kingdom has introduced a term like “cartel offence” as the
title of the section that enumerates hardcore cartels in its statute.94 However,
as discussed, such term is not regarded as a legal terminology, as the U.K.
law does not use cartel as a noun elsewhere in the law. In contrast, Hong
Kong’s Ordinance does use serious anti-competitive conduct as a noun to
represent the four conducts collectively when it describes the two sets of
harsher procedures.
1. The Dual-Track Exclusion System
The first set of harsher procedures is under a particular exclusion from
the First Conduct Rule known as an “agreement of lesser significance.”95
Schedule one of the Competition Ordinance offers exclusion procedures in
94. Competition Act, supra note 74, at § 188.
95. Competition Ordinance, supra note 5, at Schedule 1 § 5.
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six different forms. Agreements of lesser significance is one of them, and
it’s the only one that distinguishes between serious anti-competitive conduct
and other illegal agreements. Simply speaking, if several companies formed
an anti-competitive agreement prohibited by the First Conduct Rule, but the
companies’ aggregate turnover does not exceed 200 million Hong Kong
dollars, the agreement is excluded from the First Conduct Rule.96 In other
words, several small companies are allowed to form anti-competitive
agreements, as long as they don’t become too big after getting together. As
the title of the procedure (i.e. “agreement of lesser significance”) suggests,
these agreements are less significant to the market, although remaining anticompetitive in nature. However, the ordinance also clearly states that the
above exclusion does not apply to agreements that involve serious anticompetitive conduct.97 It means that legislators do not tolerate serious anticompetitive conduct, even if they are formed between relatively small
companies.
2. The Dual-Track Commitment System
The second set of dual-track procedures is formed by two commitment
systems, namely “Warning Notices” and “Infringement Notices”, following
the investigation process.98 The former applies to agreements not involving
serious anti-competitive conduct, while the latter applies to those that do
involve serious anti-competitive conduct. Either system is triggered when
the HKCC, the law enforcement agency, has reasonable cause to believe that
an agreement that violates the First Conduct Rule was formed.99 At that time,
if the HKCC has reasonable cause to believe that the agreement does not
involve serious anti-competitive conduct, it will follow the Warning Notice
system; otherwise, it will follow the Infringement Notice system.100 Next,
the author will briefly introduce the two systems one after another, then
explain why the Infringement Notice system is not only different from, but
also harsher than the Warning Notice system.
The Warning Notice system can be found at section 82 of the
Ordinance. Again, this system is triggered when the HKCC believes that
some companies formed an agreement that violates the First Conduct Rule
but does not fall into the definition of serious anti-competitive conduct.
Once the above condition is met, the HKCC must issue a “warning notice”

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at Schedule 1 § 5(1).
Id. at Schedule 1 § 5(2).
Id. at §§ 66-78, 82.
Id. at §§ 67(1)(a)(i), 82(1).
Id.
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to the companies before bringing proceedings in the Competition Tribunal.101
In the notice, the HKCC will describe the alleged illegal conduct, identify
the suspected companies involved and identify the evidence the HKCC is
using to support its allegation.102 Most importantly, the notice will require
the suspected company to cease the illegal conduct within a specific warning
period, and not to repeat that conduct afterwards.103 If the suspected
company continues or repeats the illegal conduct after the warning period,
the HKCC may bring proceedings in the Competition Tribunal against these
companies.104 The above implies that, if the suspected company does cease
the alleged conduct and does not repeat it after the warning period specified
in the notice, the HKCC could not proceed to the Competition Tribunal. In
other words, the Warning Notice system requires the law enforcement
agency to provide a second chance to companies engaging in relatively less
serious anti-competitive agreements by giving them time to rectify their
illegal conduct. Regarding how to cease the illegal conduct, as required by
the law, indications will be provided by the HKCC in the notice.105
Moreover, if the notified company wants more time to rectify its conduct, it
could apply to the HKCC for an extension of the warning period.106 Of
course, such application must be made before the original period granted
expires and is subject to the HKCC’s approval.107 Thus, the suspected
companies should be able to avoid going to the Competition Tribunal and
being penalized if they are willing to do so. Furthermore, as the law does
not require the suspected company to make any promise to the HKCC upon
receiving the warning notice, this is quite different from the Infringement
Notice system introduced below.
The Infringement Notice system can be found in sections 66 to 78 of
the Ordinance. Unlike the Warning Notice system, the Infringement Notice
system is triggered when the HKCC believes that some companies formed
an agreement which does involve serious anti-competitive conduct.108 Once
the above condition is met, and no proceeding in the Competition Tribunal
has already been brought, the HKCC may issue an “infringement notice” to
the companies before bringing proceedings in the Competition Tribunal.109
However, in contrast to the Warning Notice system, a company must commit
to complying with the requirements set forth in the infringement notice in
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at § 82(1).
Id. at § 82(2)(a)-(c).
Id. at § 82(2)(d)(i).
Id. at § 82(2)(d)(ii)-(iii).
Id. at § 82(2)(e).
Id. at § 82(6)-(7).
Id.
Id. at § 67(a).
Id. at § 67(2)-(3).
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exchange for the second chance. 110 The requirements may include, but are
not limited to, refraining from any specified conduct, taking any specified
action and/or admitting to illegal conduct.111 Similar to a warning notice, an
infringement notice will describe the alleged illegal conduct, identify the
suspected companies involved and identify the evidence the HKCC is using
to support its allegation.112 Moreover, an infringement notice specifies both
(i) the notification period, which is the time given to the notified company
for it to decide whether to accept the HKCC’s offer by making a
commitment, and (ii) the compliance period, which is the time the company
is required to keep its commitment afterwards.113 Of course, the notified
company has no obligation to make a commitment.114 Yet, if the notified
company does make a commitment within the notification period, the HKCC
cannot bring proceedings in the Competition Tribunal against that company
unless it fails to keep its promise.115 Unlike under the Warning system, the
law does not state that the HKCC has authority to extend the notification
upon receiving application from the recipient company. Comparing the two
notice systems, it is easy to see why the Infringement Notice system, which
applies to serious anti-competitive conduct, is harsher than the Warning
Notice system, which does not. First, in both situations, a company is
believed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct that violates the First
Conduct Rule. However, if no serious anti-competitive conduct is involved,
it is mandatory for the HKCC to offer the suspected company a second
chance under the Warning Notice system. Moreover, the suspected company
does not need to make any commitment beyond stopping its illegal conduct
forever. In contrast, when serious anti-competitive conduct is involved, it is
at the HKCC’s discretion to offer the suspected company a second chance
under the Infringement Notice system. Also, the suspected company needs
to make a commitment not only to rectify its illegal conduct, but probably
also to admit to the alleged conduct. This is definitely less favorable to the
suspected company.
C. Legislation History
By defining serious anti-competitive conduct and introducing harsher
procedures for them, Hong Kong legislators have created a dual-track system
in the Ordinance. This made Hong Kong the first jurisdiction attempting to
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at § 67(2).
Id. at § 67(3).
Id. at § 69.
Id. at § 66, 69(f).
Id. at § 68.
Id. at §§ 75-76.

2018]

DEFINING AND REGULATING HARDCORE CARTELS

953

capture the definition of hardcore cartels and transplanting it into its law as
a legal terminology. However, as said, the definition of serious anticompetitive conduct has deviated from hardcore cartels, an international
standard of “the most egregious violations of competition law.”116 Why did
Hong Kong legislators define serious anti-competitive conducts in the
Ordinance in the first place? Why was a dual-track system formed in the
Ordinance? Why is there a divergence between the Hong Kong legislators’
view and the international standard? To answer these questions, we will
have a quick review of the relevant legislation history.
In November 2006 and May 2008, the Hong Kong government
conducted its first and second rounds of public consultation on the region’s
competition policy.117 After the 2006 consultation, the government
published a discussion paper. This paper pointed out that, after assessing the
feedback from the public during the consultation period, some concerns were
found “in the business sector – especially among some SMEs – at the
possible effect that a new competition law might have on business
operations.”118 First, some small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
worried that they might unwittingly fall afoul of the new law while others
worried that large companies might use litigation as a strategic tool to harass
them.119 Thus, the government stated that it would keep in mind the concerns
of SMEs when it drafted the new competition law for Hong Kong.120 In the
2008 public consultation paper, the government did respond to the SMEs’
concerns. For example, after consulting local and overseas experts, the
government believed that an anti-competitive agreement formed between
SMEs would not have sufficient market power to lessen competition
substantially unless such agreement involved “‘hard-core’ conduct.”121 The
government referred to hardcore conduct as “price fixing, bid rigging, output
restriction and market allocation.”122 This is the very first time the
government mentioned the term “hardcore conduct” and briefly elaborated
the term in its consultation paper. It is not hard to see that the government

116. OECD, supra note 2.
117. LEGIS. COUNCIL, Updated Background Brief on the Introduction of a Competition
Law in Hong Kong 2 (Jun. 28, 2010) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0910/english/panels/edev/papers/edev0628cb1-2301-4-e.pdf.
118. ECON. DEV. AND LAB. BUREAU, Way Forward for Competition Policy 1-2 (Mar.
2007) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr06-07/english/panels/es/papers/es0326cb1-1178-1e.pdf.
119. Id. at Annex Chapter 2, 6-7.
120. Id. at 4.
121. COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, Public Consultation on Detailed Proposals of
a Competition Law 6 (May 6, 2008) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0708/english/panels/es/papers/edev0506-citbcr05622513-e.pdf.
122. Id. at Annex 45.
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was trying to refer to hardcore cartels as defined by the OECD. However,
the government did not clearly specify that “hardcore conduct” was only
limited to agreements between competitors (i.e. horizontal agreements).
Therefore, on one hand, highlighting “hardcore conduct” in the consultation
paper had far-reaching significance to defining “serious anti-competitive
conduct” in the Ordinance that eventually passed. On the other hand, it
seems that the later divergence between the legislators and the international
standard has long been buried in the consultation stage, likely by ignorance.
Second, to address the SMEs’ concerns, the government suggested the law
require the HKCC to later clarify in its guidelines that a “[d]e minimis
approach” would be adopted.123 Under such approach, if several companies
form an anti-competitive agreement, they would not be penalized if their
aggregate market share does not exceed a certain threshold unless the
agreement involves “hardcore conduct.”124 The government has referenced
other jurisdictions, such as the U.S. and Singapore, when making this
suggestion.125 Thus, such proposal is very similar to the Singapore exclusion
system introduced in the previous section of this Comment. This is exactly
the prototype of the “agreement of lesser significance,” which, as discussed
earlier, was adopted in the Ordinance eventually. 126 The government’s
response to the SMEs’ concern is not limited to the above two discussions.127
Yet, they are the two examples that are most relevant to this Comment.
Another point worth mentioning is that, in the consultation paper, the
government suggested that the law should give a general definition of what
agreements are prohibited and not give a list of examples of anti-competitive
agreements.128 In doing so, the government intended to avoid spending
unnecessary resources on arguing whether a specific agreement is prohibited.
Instead, it is much simpler to focus on whether a presented agreement has
the purpose or effect of lessening competition substantially.129
After consulting the public, in September 2008, the government
published a report for the second consultation.130 The report pointed out that
various measures proposed by the government to address SMEs’ concerns
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 90 92- and accompanying text
127. More examples of the government’s response to the SMEs’ concerns can be found
at Chapter V of the 2008 consultation paper. COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, supra
note 121, at 44-47.
128. Id. at 23-24.
129. Id. at 25.
130. COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, Report on Public Consultation on the Detailed
Proposals
for
a
Competition
Law
(Sept.
2008)
(H.K.),
http://www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/doc/en/publication/Consultation_Report_30_9.pdf.
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were well acknowledged, including the de minimis approach.131 Some
respondents suggested the threshold used in the approach could be measured
in terms of not only market share, as the government proposed, but also the
turnover of the companies involved. 132 However, some other respondents
remained worried that the new law would affect SMEs adversely.133 On the
other hand, some respondents suggested, in addition to having a general
definition of illegal agreements, the new law should include a nonexhaustive list of examples of conduct that would commonly be considered
anti-competitive. 134 By doing so, the new law could provide more legal
certainty to the business sector.135
On July 2, 2010, the Hong Kong government gazetted the Competition
Bill (hereinafter the Bill).136 The proposed law was submitted to the
Legislative Council twelve days later for First Reading.137 Similar to the
Ordinance eventually passed, the First Conduct Rule in the Bill gave a
general definition of prohibited agreements.138 The general terms are pretty
much the same between the Ordinance and the Bill. Unlike the Ordinance,
the Bill subsequently clarified the general term as follows: “applies in
particular to agreements, concerted practices and decisions that — (a)
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, technical development
or investment; or (c) share markets or sources of supply.”139
Obviously, the three examples of illegal conduct enumerated are price
fixing, output restriction and market allocation - three of the hardcore
conducts identified by the government in the 2008 consultation paper.140 The
government explained that these examples were included to “enhance the
certainty and clarity of the law.”141 In contrast to the Ordinance, the Bill did
not define serious anti-competitive conduct, or other terms close to it,
elsewhere. Without distinguishing serious anti-competitive conduct, there
was no dual-track system built in the Bill. First, there was an Infringement
131. Id. at 6.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 4.
136. GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION (GovHK),
Competition
Bill
Gazetted
(July
2,
2010)
(H.K.),
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201007/02/P201007020101.htm.
137. Id.
138. Competition Bill, (2010) C879, §6(1) (H.K.), http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0910/english/bills/b201007022.pdf.
139. Id. at §6(2).
140. COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, supra note 121.
141. LEGIS. COUNCIL, Legislative Council Brief Competition Bill 2 (July 2, 2010) (H.K.),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-10/english/bills/brief/b35_brf.pdf.
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Notice system, but no Warning Notice system in the Bill.142 Although they
were named the same, the Infringement Notice system in the Bill was
different from that in the Ordinance passed later on. The key difference was
that the former was applicable to all illegal agreements while the latter was
only applicable to serious anti-competitive conduct. In other words, price
fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging were not treated
harsher than other conducts in the Bill. Under the notice system in the Bill,
whenever the HKCC believed that some companies formed an agreement,
regardless of its seriousness, the HKCC could offer the companies a second
chance conditional to the companies’ commitment to comply.143 On the
other hand, the Bill did not include a de minimis approach (i.e. the prototype
of the “agreement of lesser significance” later adopted in the Ordinance) as
suggested in the 2008 consultation paper.144 Actually, early when the
government conducted the 2008 consultation, it noticed that the de minimis
system could be established either in the new law or agency guideline after
referencing international experience. 145 Considering the fact that Hong Kong
is a small economy, the government expressed its intent to follow Singapore
and let the agency set up the de minimis system in its guideline.146
As a general procedure of lawmaking in Hong Kong, First Reading is
simply the Clerk of the Legislative Council reading out the title of the bill.147
Then, the Council will order the bill to be set down for Second Reading, and
the debate of the bill will be adjourned.148 At a subsequent meeting, the
House Committee will order to form a Bills Committee to scrutinize the bill
if, and only if, the bill is too controversial or complicated.149 On October 8,
2010, Hong Kong’s legislators formed a Bills Committee on Competition
Bill (BCCB) to scrutinize the Bill.150 During deliberations, the BCCB noted
that the Bill had adopted a general prohibition approach to combat hardcore
conduct and non-hardcore conduct.151 Some members of the Committee
worried that “SMEs might unwittingly breach the law because of the lack of
certainty in this catch-all general prohibition.”152 Further, such approach
142. Competition Bill, supra note 138, at §65-77.
143. Id. at §66(2).
144. COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, supra note 121.
145. COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, supra note 121, at Annex 46.
146. Id.
147. LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, How Laws are Made 2 (Feb. 2017) (H.K.),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/education/files/english/Factsheet/Factsheet7.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, Report of the Bills Committee on Competition Bill 3
(May
23,
2012)
(H.K.),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr0910/english/bc/bc12/reports/bc120530cb1-1919-e.pdf.
151. Id. at 7.
152. Id. at 7.
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would create a “huge burden for SMEs as the inadvertent breach of a less
serious nature might still attract a heavy fine.”153 As a result, some members
of the Committee suggested the government adopt a “two-track approach.”154
In response, the government acknowledged: “the market needs a swift and
effective response to hardcore anti-competitive activities because they
almost always have an adverse impact on competition, the Administration
accepts a lighter enforcement approach in respect of non-hardcore
activities.”155
In other words, the government was willing to take the advice of the
Committee and adopt a dual-track system by introducing more lenient
procedures for non-hardcore conduct. First, the government proposed to
specify “price-fixing, bid-rigging, market allocation and output control, as
‘serious anti-competitive conduct’ in the Bill.”156 These conducts are chosen
because the government noticed that oversea jurisdictions have recognized
them as conducts which “will always have an adverse impact on
competition.”157 Second, the government proposed to introduce a Warning
Notice system for non-hardcore conduct.158 By doing so, companies that
participated in non-hardcore conduct could be warned before the HKCC took
any legal proceedings. The government suggested that if companies were
given a chance to correct their mistakes, their exposure to sanctions would
be reduced. 159 The Committee recognized that this could reduce the risk of
companies, particularly SMEs, falling foul of the law unknowingly.160 On
the other hand, some members of the BCCB argued the SMEs have limited
impact on the economy and should be completely exempted from the Bill.161
The government disagreed with the Committee and claimed that SMEs could
make a significant impact on the market after collusion.162 Therefore, the
Committee recommended that the government reference other countries and
include a de minimis exclusion system in the Bill to provide greater certainty
to SMEs.163 The government agreed to do so but clearly stated that such
exclusion is not applicable to the four hardcore conducts since they almost
always affect competition adversely.164
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
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On June 6, 2012, the Second Reading debate of the Bill was resumed.165
On the same day, after the debate, a vote was taken on the motion for the
Second Reading of the Bill.166 The majority of the legislators present voted
in favor of the motion. Thus, immediately, the lawmaking process proceeded
to the Committee Stage in which Legislative Council sat as a “Committee of
the whole Council.”167 At this Committee Stage, the Secretary for
Commerce and Economic Development (Secretary for CED), who
represented the government, moved for amendments to the Bill.168 These
amendments included, but were not limited to, the following: (i) deleting
section 6(2) which contained the three conducts listed as examples
supplementing the general prohibition under First Conduct Rule169; (ii)
adding a term “serious anti-competitive conduct” in section 2(1) which
covers the four hardcore conducts defended by the Hong Kong
government;170 (iii) introducing a dual-track commitment system, as
proposed, by adding the Warning Notice system171 and amending section 66
of the Infringement Notice system172; and (iv) adding the “agreement[] of
lesser significance” exclusion system at Schedule 1 of the Bill as proposed.173
In some subsequent meetings, the amendments moved for by the government
were adopted.174 On June 14, 2012, the Secretary moved a motion that “[t]he
bill be read the third time and do pass,” the Bill proceeded to Third
Reading.175 Then, the legislators voted, and the motion was passed.176 The
Competition Bill completed its passage in the Legislative Council.177
A few questions were raised at the beginning of this subsection. Now
165. LEGIS.
COUNCIL,
Council
Meeting,
(Jun.
6,
2012)
(H.K.),
http://webcast.legco.gov.hk/public/en-us/SearchResult?MeetingID=M11100023.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Competition Bill at the Committee Stage (with Amendments to be Moved by the
Secretary for Commerce and Economic Development), (Jun. 6, 2012) (H.K.),
http://www.legco.gov.hk/reporter/english/legco_bill201206201-e.pdf.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id. at 1-2.
171. Id. at 15-18.
172. Id. at 14.
173. Id. at 35-37.
174. LEGIS. COUNCIL, The LegCo Reporter Issue No. 33, (Jun. 20, 2012) (H.K.),
http://app.legco.gov.hk/reporter/english/report.aspx?i=52; LEGIS. COUNCIL, The LegCo
Reporter
Issue
No.
31,
(Jun.
9,
2012)
(H.K.),
http://app.legco.gov.hk/reporter/english/report.aspx?i=50.
175. LEGIS. COUNCIL, Council Meeting (Continuation of the Council meeting of
13/6/2012),
(Jun.
14,
2012)
(H.K.),
http://webcast.legco.gov.hk/public/enus/SearchResult?MeetingID=M12060029.
176. Id.
177. In general, if the motion on Third Reading is passed, a bill completes its passage in
Hong Kong. LEGIS. COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, supra note 147, at 3.
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that a brief review of the legislation’s history has been given, this comment
will address those questions. First, why was a dual-track system formed in
the Ordinance? The simple answer is that the legislators did that in response
to the concerns of the SMEs. Starting from the consultation in 2006, SMEs
have expressed their worries.178 Although the government made some
suggestions during the second consultation in 2008, the SMEs’ worries
remained.179 Therefore, the legislators, represented by the BCCB, pressured
the government to respond to the voice of the SMEs when the Bill was
scrutinized prior to the resumption of the Second Reading in 2012. In
response, the government proposed a lot of changes and submitted
amendments to the Bill, which were eventually passed.180 This explanation
also helps answer the second question - why did Hong Kong legislators
define serious anti-competitive conducts in the Ordinance in the first place?
Clearly, serious anti-competitive conduct was defined mainly to facilitate the
government in creating the dual-track system and to provide more legal
certainty. The third question is why is there a divergence between Hong
Kong legislators’ standards and the international standard? Early in the 2008
consultation, after conferring with experts and referencing international
experience, the government noticed that some anti-competitive activities
were more serious than others. The government referred to these more
serious activities as hardcore conducts, namely price fixing, output
restriction, market allocation and bid rigging. However, as said, the
government was not aware that international communities would only refer
to the four conducts between competitors (i.e. horizontal agreements) as “the
most egregious violations of competition law.”181 Nonetheless, the
government continued to use its own definition of hardcore conduct and
developed the term “serious anti-competitive conduct” later on when
responding to the needs of SMEs and the BCCB.182 The author of this
Comment has not seen evidence of legislators challenging whether this
definition should exclude vertical agreements during the Committee Stage
debate. Therefore, such subtle difference between hardcore cartels and
serious anti-competitive conduct snuck into the Ordinance of Hong Kong.
Although the definition of serious anti-competitive conduct was invented
and proposed by the government, the legislators were responsible for this too
because they had eventually voted for the law.
III.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

ANALYZING THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
ECON. DEV. AND LAB. BUREAU, supra note 118, at 1-2.
COMMERCE AND ECON. DEV. BUREAU, supra note 130, at 6.
Supra notes 168-174.
OECD, supra note 2, at 2.
Competition Bill at the Committee Stage, supra note 170, at 1-2.
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So far, we have learned not only that there is a divergence between the
international standard and Hong Kong legislation, but also why such
divergence exists. The next question would be: is such divergence
justifiable? In other words, whether vertical price fixing, vertical output
restriction, vertical market allocation and vertical bid rigging included in the
definition of serious anti-competitive conducts, but not in hardcore cartels,
are indeed more severe violations of antitrust law. In Section I.B of this
Comment, the author has spent a lot of time explaining the rationale behind
the analysis used to justify that hardcore cartels defined by the OECD is more
serious than many other cartels. In short, conducts analyzed by the U.S.
court under the per se rule are more serious than conducts analyzed under
the RoR. Similarly, in this Section, the author has selected a U.S. case for
each of the four vertical activities and looked into the court’s attitude towards
these cases. Different from Section I.B, cases selected for analysis in this
Section, except for the very old vertical market allocation case, were decided
within fifteen years from 2012, instead of from 1998. In Section I.B, we
have chosen cases before 1998 because we wanted to see whether the
definition of hardcore cartels was justifiable, at least in term of seriousness,
at the time it was introduced. In contrast, in this Section, we would like to
see whether the definition of serious anti-competitive conducts is still
justifiable now. Obviously, the international communities’ attitude towards
the four vertical agreements might have changed over time. Relevant cases
continued to develop between 1998 when OECD introduced the term
hardcore cartels and 2012 when Hong Kong introduced the term of serious
anti-competitive conduct. As overseas courts shifted from applying the per
se rule to applying the RoR to the four vertical conducts rule, Hong Kong
should have captured the recent development and excluded those conducts
from the definition of serious anti-competitive conduct. Not to mention that,
in reality, there has not been a strong opinion that the four vertical conducts
are a more serious violation of antitrust law. Therefore, most of the cases
selected below were decided within 15 years before 2012 when the
Competition Ordinance of Hong Kong was passed.
A. Vertical Price Fixing
Regarding U.S. courts’ attitudes towards vertical price fixing, the
author refers to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Leegin Creative Leather
Prods. V. PSKS, Inc., decided in 2007.183 This is a significant case since the
183. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
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Supreme Court overruled an almost 100-year old precedent set forth in Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,184 which established that
vertical price restraints are per se violations of the Sherman Act.185
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (hereinafter Leegin), the
defendant in the case, was a company which manufactured leather goods and
accessories. 186 Leegin had many retailers that helped distribute its
products.187 PSKS, Inc., (hereinafter PSKS), the plaintiff in the case, was a
retailer that once distributed Leegin’s products.188 Leegin’s business strategy
was to have its retailers focus on customer service, instead of discounting.189
Thus, the company introduced pricing policies and refused to sell to retailers
that sold its products below the suggested price.190 PSKS violated the price
policy and offered consumers a twenty percent discount for Leegin’s
products.191 Leegin discovered this discount and requested PSKS to cease
discounting.192 PSKS refused to do so.193 Therefore, Leegin stopped selling
to PSKS. As a result, PSKS suffered economic loss and, hence, sued Leegin
under section 1 of the Sherman Act for fixing the price with its retailers.194
Lower courts, basing their decisions mainly on the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court in the 1911 Dr. Miles case, ruled against the defendant by
holding that vertical minimum price fixing was a per se violation of the
Sherman Act.195 Yet, Leegin argued that the RoR should have applied
instead and appealed to the Supreme Court.196 The key issue presented
before the Supreme Court was, should the per se rule or the RoR be applied
to vertical price restraints, including the minimum resale price maintenance
agreements formed between manufacturers and their retailers.197
In response, the Supreme Court first reviewed the rationales upon which
Dr. Miles relied and rejected their justifications for a per se rule against
vertical minimum resale price agreements.198 Then, the Supreme Court
turned to evaluate the economic effects (i.e. pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects) of such agreements to determine whether the per se rule
184.
185.
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188.
189.
190.
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was nonetheless appropriate.199 On the pro-competitive side, the court
identified that vertical minimum resale price agreements could stimulate
interbrand (non-price) competition by reducing intrabrand (price)
competition.200 And it was interbrand competition, rather than intrabrand
competition, that antitrust laws primarily aimed at protecting.201 For
example, Leegin had many retailers that sold their products to consumers.
These retailers needed to compete among themselves for more sales (i.e.
intrabrand competition), by engaging in price and or non-price competition.
Price competition would simply be reducing the resale price of Leegin’s
product, while non-price competition could be in the form of increasing sales
services or promotions. However, providing better services or more
promotions was costly. Therefore, there was a tradeoff between price
competition and non-price competition.202 For instance, by setting a
minimum resale price, Leegin could ensure its retailers sufficient profit
margins to provide quality services and enough promotions.203 In addition,
if there was no agreement on resale price, some retailers might free ride on
the efforts of other retailers under the same brand in providing services and
promotions. Sparing retailers that effort would benefit the entire Leegin
brand, rather than just its own store. Therefore, the retailer that did not make
that effort would be able to reduce price and “steal” other retailers’
consumers. Thus, Leegin’s retailers would be discouraged from providing
more services and promotions. As seen, overall, having a minimum resale
price agreement could ensure a certain level of non-price competition among
Leegin’s retailers (i.e. intrabrand competition). Since there were more
services and promotions provided by Leegin’s retailers, retailers of other
manufacturer brands would face pressure to follow suit to avoid losing their
consumers. For that reason, the Supreme Court suggested that a vertical
price restraint could be pro-competitive by reducing intrabrand price
competition, and hence increasing interbrand non-price competition.
Furthermore, since some manufacturers might position themselves as “highprice, high-service brands”, this gave room for “low-price, low-service
brands” to enter the market.204 Vertical minimum resale price agreements
would also be considered pro-competitive as they could not only provide
more brand options to consumers, but also stimulate intrabrand price and
non-price competition in the industry.205
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
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On the other hand, the Supreme Court identified four circumstances
under which having vertical minimum resale price agreements might be anticompetitive. First, such agreements could be used to facilitate horizontal
price-fixing agreements among manufacturers mainly for obtaining
monopoly profits.206 Having each manufacturer set a minimum resale price
for its retailers could be helpful to the cartel among manufacturers. It is
because this could not only discourage individual manufacturers from
reducing the price by making it more troublesome to do so, but also because
it could assist the cartel in identifying betrayers who set a price below the
agreed level.207 Second, vertical minimum resale price agreements could be
used to facilitate horizontal price fixing agreements among retailers.208
Normally, retailers that work for a particular manufacturer could compete
against each other by reducing costs (e.g. distribution cost), and hence resale
price. This means that the cost reduction driven by competition is largely
captured by consumers in the form of lower prices. Therefore, some retailers
have an incentive to form a cartel and force the manufacturer to set a
minimum resale price for all retailers so that they could all enjoy more profits
by facing less price competition.209 In either case, a conspiracy among
manufacturers or retailers, or a vertical minimum resale price agreement
used to facilitate a horizontal price-fixing scheme, which is per se illegal,
would be found by the courts to be a violation of the Sherman Act even under
the RoR.210 Third, resale price maintenance could be anti-competitive when
adopted by a manufacturer due to the coercion of its dominant retailer.211 In
such cases, the dominant retailer could enjoy a certain level of profit even
without reducing its distribution cost.212 Fourth, vertical minimum resale
price agreements could be anti-competitive when adopted by a dominant
manufacturer to harm its competitors.213 By providing its retailers more
profit through the price agreements, the manufacturer could in exchange ask
its retailers not to distribute goods for other manufacturers.214
As identified by the Supreme Court and presented above, vertical resale
price agreements could have pro-competitive and or anti-competitive effects.
It would be hard to determine whether a vertical resale price agreement is
pro-competitive or anti-competitive overall without evaluating the specific
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circumstances.215 Although applying the per se rule, rather than RoR, to
conduct is less administratively costly to courts, it is counterproductive to
society if doing so prohibits conduct that could generate a net procompetitive effect.216 Since vertical resale price agreements do not “always
or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output,” the court
thought it would be risky to categorize such agreements as per se violations
of the Sherman Act.217 Mainly based on the above analysis, the court
overruled Dr. Miles and held that vertical price restraints should be judged
by the RoR.218
As seen through this analysis, the Supreme Court refused to apply the
per se rule, which applies to “hardcore cartels,” to a vertical minimum resale
price agreement. 219 Because such vertical agreements, together with other
forms of vertical price-fixing agreements, have the possibility of creating a
net pro-competitive effect that benefits society, the author suggests that
vertical price-fixing agreements should not be put on par with “hardcore
cartels” and placed in the same category as “serious anti-competitive
conducts” in Hong Kong’s Competition Ordinance.
B. Vertical Output Restriction
Given that a horizontal output restriction agreement would be
something like several competitors agreeing to sell less quantity of a type of
good, one may expect vertical output restriction cases to look like a
manufacturer setting a limit on the number of its products that its distributors
could sell. This is exactly the kind of case the author has tried to identify for
this Comment. Unfortunately, the author could not find any case that shared
the same parameters. Therefore, before introducing the less ideal case
selected for our analysis, the author briefly suggests below why a lawsuit
with the above described vertical output restriction may be extremely rare.
Assume that there was a dominant manufacturer in an industry which
sold its product to the market via two distributors. First, would the
manufacturer have an incentive to limit its output? The answer is probably
yes. Just like any monopoly, the manufacturer could raise selling price by
reducing output and hence extract monopoly profit. Having two distributors
introduced between the manufacturer and consumers did not seem to alter
such a monopoly profit extracting mechanism. Second, how could the
215.
216.
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manufacturer limit its output in the market? It seems that there could be three
ways in which the manufacturer could achieve such goal: (1) selling the
goods to the two retailers at a higher price to discourage them from buying,
(2) setting a limit on the quantity of goods the two retailers could buy from
the manufacturer or (3) setting a limit on the quantity of goods the two
retailers could sell to consumers. Although all three approaches could reduce
supply in the market, approaches (1) and (2) seem to be more acceptable to
retailers. It is simply because the manufacturer, like all sellers in the market,
has a right to set the selling price of its goods and decide the quantity of
goods to be sold to its retailers. Approach (3) is more problematic and most
likely to trigger disputes because it gives retailers the feeling that they are
restrained by the manufacturer. When attempting to reduce output in the
market, since the manufacturer always has the option to adopt approaches
(1) or (2) to avoid the complications of approach (3), this may explain why
it is rare to see a lawsuit involving an approach (3) agreement. Having said
that, there is a reason why approach (3) could be preferable to the
manufacturer. That is, approach (3) is the only way the manufacturer could
eliminate retailers’ ability to control supply in the long run by hoarding the
manufactured good over time for future sales.
An ideal case for our analysis would be one that involves an approach
(3) type of agreement between a manufacturer and its retailers, which clearly
specifies the maximum quantity of goods the latter could sell. However, as
said, the author could not identify such a case after exerting his best effort.
Therefore, a less ideal case is selected for this subsection to analyze U.S.
courts’ attitude towards vertical output restriction agreements. The case
chosen is Ezzo’s Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., decided by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 2001.220 In this case,
the plaintiff distributor alleged that its output of defendant manufacturer’s
product was restricted, but in a way other than the defendant specifying a
quantity and prohibiting the plaintiff from selling more than that quantity of
products.
Matrix Essentials, Inc., (hereinafter Matrix), was a company that
produced professional salon products.221 Royal Beauty Supply, (hereinafter
Royal), was Matrix’s Nashville area distributor that would reach out to
salons and see if they were interested in reselling Matrix’s salon products.222
Matrix and its distributors, including Royal, formed agreements which
allowed the latter to sell, “Matrix products only to salons that derive more
than 50% of their revenue from hair-care services rather than product sales,”

220. Ezzo’s Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 243 F.3d 980 (2001).
221. Id. at 983.
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(hereinafter 50% rule).223 Basically, this policy distinguished between (1)
salons whose main source of income was derived from providing hair-care
services and (2) salons whose main source of income was derived from
selling salon products. The plaintiff salon in this case, Ezzo’s Investment,
Inc. (hereinafter Ezzo), belonged to the second group.224 In 1989, when
Royal attempted to sell Matrix’s product to Ezzo for resale, it was undisputed
that Ezzo did not fulfill the 50% rule. During the negotiation process, Ezzo
claimed that it had expressed to Royal that it was not willing to be bound by
the 50% rule; while Royal claimed that Ezzo “agreed to add styling chairs to
[its] salon in order to increase service revenues” to comply with the 50%
rule.225 Ezzo contended that an agreement to add styling chairs was
formed.226 Thereafter, Ezzo did successfully buy Matrix’s product from
Royal and started to resell them for a couple of months.227 Later on, Royal
received complaints from other Nashville salons that Ezzo had been violating
the 50% rule and offering discounts for Matrix’s products.228 In response,
Royal required Ezzo to sell Matrix’s products at the suggested retail price;
otherwise, it would cut Ezzo off.229 Ezzo refused to follow.230 Soon after
that, Royal stopped selling to Ezzo on the basis that the latter breached the
50% rule.231 Then, Ezzo filed a lawsuit against Matrix and Royal.232 The
case was first decided by the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Tennessee (hereinafter the lower court). Ezzo alleged that the
50% rule between Matrix and Royal was a vertical restraint that constituted
a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, because the rule “throttles
output and discourages or prevents price competition.”233 Yet, while
granting a partial summary judgment to Matrix, the lower court applied the
RoR and held that the 50% rule did not violate the Sherman Act.234 Thus,
Ezzo appealed.235 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, (hereinafter the appeals court), addressed two issues: (1)
whether it was appropriate for the lower court to examine the case under RoR
and (2) whether it was proper for the lower court to find no violation of the
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Sherman Act under RoR.236
First, the appeals court held that it was proper for the lower court to
examine the 50% rule under RoR.237 The court explained that it would
normally examine an unlawful restraint on trade action under the RoR on a
case-by-case basis. Exceptions have been given to conduct, which would be
treated according to the per se rule instead, “that would always or almost
always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.”238 In addition to
the general rules stated above, the appeals court further explained that
vertical agreements are treated differently from horizontal agreements.239
The court held that vertical agreements would be examined under the RoR
unless they involved restraints on price.240 This is because, without price
restriction, vertical agreements primarily affect intrabrand competition,
rather than interbrand competition, and this is not the primary concern of
antitrust law.241 In contrast, horizontal agreements primarily affect
interbrand competition, which is the main concern of the law.242 The key
argument of Ezzo related to the rules specific to the vertical agreement was
that the 50% rule limited output to fix prices at a suggested retail level, and
hence affected interbrand competition.243 The appeals court rejected such
argument by disagreeing that the 50% rule could or was to limit sales, since
salons could still increase sales of Matrix’s product without violating the rule
agreed with Matrix, for example, by increasing the volume of hair-care
services.244
Then, relying on a similar rationale, as one of three bases, the appeals
court affirmed that it was proper for the lower court to find no violation of
the Sherman Act under RoR.245 Citing its own precedent, the appeals court
held that, to make his or her case under the RoR, a plaintiff would need to
show that an alleged vertical restraint has adversely affected competition at
interbrand level.246 As described above, Ezzo did attempt to prove this.
236. Id. at 985-989.
237. Id. at 985.
238. Id. at 986 (quoting NW. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co.,
427 U.S. 284, 289-290 (1985)).
239. Id. at 986-87.
240. Id. at 987 (citing Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S.
717, 735 (1988)).
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 988 (explaining that the other two bases were about Matrix’s market power and
the possibility of Matrix acting independently (i.e., a justification for imposing restrictions, if
any)).
246. Id. (citing Crane & Shovel Sales Corp. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 854 F.2d 802, 810
(6thCir. 1988)).
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Ezzo’s theory that the 50% rule adversely affected interbrand competition
was built on the assumption that the supply of Matrix’s products was
restricted by preventing salons from “aggressive merchandising”.247
However, the court held that such a premise was incorrect since, as
explained, salons could get around the rule and increase the supply of
Matrix’s products. Thus, the appeals court decided that Ezzo failed to offer
evidence to prove adverse effects on interbrand competition under the 50%
rule, which was one of the reasons for the court to believe that the 50% rule
was not an unreasonable restraint on trade.248
From the above, first, one could see that vertical output restriction cases
are extremely uncommon. Given that these kinds of cases are not decided
over and over again in U.S. courts, how would courts be confident that this
conduct is almost always anti-competitive? This means that it is extremely
unlikely for courts to apply the per se rule when analyzing vertical output
restriction agreements. Second, even if there is a dispute about a vertical
restraint of output, as demonstrated in Ezzo’s, the court may find that the
agreement could not limit output successfully and the restraint may survive
the more lenient RoR examination. Therefore, the author suggests that
vertical output restrictions are less likely to be harmful than hardcore cartels
and should not be categorized as “serious anti-competitive conduct” in Hong
Kong’s Competition Ordinance.
C. Vertical Market Allocation
The case selected for this subsection, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., was decided in 1977 by the Supreme Court.249 This is a classic
case of its kind. Although it is a very old case, it has not been overruled over
the years.250 Therefore, the analysis below is valid not only, (in the U.S.
courts), in 2012 when Hong Kong defined serious anti-competitive conduct,
but also now. It means that if Hong Kong today considers whether to exclude
vertical market allocation agreements from the definition of serious anticompetitive conduct, this case could be used as a reference.
In GTE Sylvania Inc., (hereinafter Sylvania), the defendant in the case,
manufactured TVs and had one to two percent of the U.S. market.251 In 1962,
it began selling TVs directly to a small group of franchised retailers.252 The
franchise agreement did not grant an exclusive territory, but it did limit
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 987.
Id. at 988-89.
Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
The author shepardized the case and found that the case has not been overruled yet.
Cont’l T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 38.
Id.
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retailers at Sylvania’s discretion and prevented them from selling anywhere
but their franchised locations.253 This arrangement seemed to work;
Sylvania’s market share rose to five percent.254 Continental T.V., Inc.,
(hereinafter Continental), was one of Sylvania’s franchisees and was one of
the best distributors Sylvania had.255 Later on, two disputes arose between
Sylvania and Continental. First, Sylvania assigned the second franchisee
very close to Continental in San Francisco. Continental was upset about it.256
Second, Continental attempted to open a store in Sacramento where there
were other Sylvania retailers already. Sylvania denied the request.257
Eventually, the dispute between Sylvania and Continental escalated.258
Therefore, Continental sued Sylvania alleging that the location restriction
clause prohibited the sale of products other than from the specified location,
violating section 1 of the Sherman Act.259
The key issue in the case was: should the per se rule or RoR be applied
to vertical market allocation agreements?260 Ultimately, in this case, the
court decided that RoR should be applied instead of the per se rule.261 The
court did so because it acknowledged the complexity of vertical market
allocation agreements.262 The court explained that such agreements might
not only reduce intrabrand competition but might also stimulate interbrand
competition at the same time.263
On one hand, intrabrand competition is reduced because of the decline
in the number of sellers of the same brand (e.g., franchised retailers in this
case) in a particular location.264 Obviously, if there are two franchised
retailers selling the exact same branded product who are located next to each
other, consumers are very likely to buy from the retailer offering the lower
price. This gives the two retailers huge pressure to compete on price.
However, if they are far apart from each other, the price competition would
be less vigorous. Although consumers who live nearby a particular retailer
can choose to shop at the farther retailer, they may be reluctant to do so. This
is because it is costly to obtain price information from the latter retailer and
make a price comparison, and it is costly to travel to the latter shop just for
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 41-42.
Id. at 58-59.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 54.
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the purchase. Although not giving further elaboration, the court implied that
the above reduction of intrabrand competition could stimulate interbrand
competition as well.265 The logic is simply that with fewer sellers of a
particular brand in an area, competition therein is less saturated. This makes
it more attractive for sellers of the same product, but with different brands,
who are not bound by the vertical agreement to start doing business there.
On the other hand, interbrand competition is stimulated also because of
the elimination of the free rider problem.266 Recall the example raised earlier
in which two franchised retailers sold the exact same branded product and
sat next to each other. If one of the two retailers spent money on advertising
on the radio about the good quality of its product, would the second retailer
also spend money to do a promotion? The answer is no. It is because the
products sold by the two retailers are identical. When consumers are
attracted by the advertisement to the first retailer, they will notice that there
is another shop selling the same product next door. They will compare the
prices before making a purchase decision. Although the first retailer has
spent money on advertising, it has obtained no advantage over the second
retailer on getting more sales from the investment. If a consumer is attracted
to the location by the first retailer’s advertisement and eventually shops at
the second retailer, we describe this as the second retailer free riding on the
first retailer’s investment. Therefore, knowing this, both retailers would be
hesitant to make such an investment. As a result, promotion investment in
that area would be less than optimal and inefficiency would occur. Most
importantly, for our concerns, the competitiveness of the two retailers in that
area would drop as a whole, resulting in less competition with retailers that
sell other brands therein (i.e., interbrand competition). This is because the
two retailers’ competitors, selling products of a different brand, may spend
money on advertisements to gain popularity. Thanks to the advertisements,
consumers may be persuaded that the advertised brand’s product has a better
quality (which may not be true in reality). Hence, some consumers may buy
from the advertised brand even if it charges a higher price than the
unadvertised brand. As a result, the advertising retailer may charge higher
prices as it faces less pressure to compete with the two retailers that are
discouraged to promote their brand due to the free rider problem. In other
words, with vertical market allocation agreements, the two franchised
retailers that sold the exact same branded product would have less incentive
to free ride each other and higher incentive to spend money in advertising.
265. Id. (holding that “[a]lthough intrabrand competition may be reduced, the ability of
retailers to exploit the resulting market may be limited both by the ability of consumers to
travel to other franchised locations and, perhaps more importantly, to purchase the competing
products of other manufacturers.”)
266. Id. at 54-55.
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Therefore, the two retailers’ competitiors, selling products of a different
brand, would not only need to compete with the two retailers on the quality
of advertisments, but also face pressure to charge a lower price to prevent
the two retailers from stealing their consumers by advertising. This is why
the court held that vertical market allocation could stimulate interbrand
competition.
All in all, as said, the court believes that vertical market allocation
agreements could reduce intrabrand competition and stimulate interbrand
competition at the same time. As explained by the court in 1977 and
elaborated above, the reduction of intrabrand competition may generate anticompetitive effects, while the stimulation of interbrand competition may
generate a pro-competitive effect. Without weighing the two effects, it is
hard to tell which effect would outweigh the other in a particular case. The
author believes this is why the court refused to classify vertical market
allocation agreements as a per se illegal category and decided that RoR
should be applied in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. Since such
vertical market allocation agreements may create net pro-competitive effects
and benefit the economy, they should not be put on par with “hardcore
cartels” and placed in the same category as “serious anti-competitive
conduct” in Hong Kong’s competition law.
D. Vertical Bid Rigging
Lastly, regarding U.S. courts’ attitude towards vertical bid rigging, the
author refers to Phillips Getschow Co. v. Green Bay Brown County
Professional Football Stadium District, decided in 2003 by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.267 Although this is
neither a popular case nor a case decided by the Supreme Court, the author
is citing this case because it has a few insightful points that could help us to
understand why vertical bid rigging should not be regarded as serious anticompetitive conduct. Moreover, this case was decided before 2012 when
Hong Kong defined serious anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, the Hong
Kong government or legislators could have referenced this case back then.
If Hong Kong today considers whether to exclude vertical bid rigging
agreements from the definition of serious anti-competitive conduct, this case
could be used as a reference because it has not yet been overruled.268
In Wisconsin, there is an outdoor athletic stadium called Lambeau
Field. Once, the field needed to be renovated. Defendants, a football
267. Phillips Getschow Co. v. Green Bay Brown Cty. Prof’l Football Stadium Dist., 270
F. Supp. 2d 1043 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
268. The author shepardized the case and found that the case has not been overruled yet.
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stadium municipality, a developer and a general contractor (hereinafter
defendants) were responsible for the renovation project.269 The defendants
invited companies to bid on the heating, venting and air conditioning
contract.270 The plaintiff, Phillips Getschow Company, was one of the
contractors that submitted a bid for the contract.271 The bidding was
supposed to be closed, meaning “that bid amounts were not to be disclosed
until a contract was awarded, and that the lowest bid was to be accepted by
the defendants.”272 In the first, and supposedly the only, round of bidding,
the plaintiff submitted the lowest bid.273 However, thereafter, the defendants
disclosed the bid amounts to a few privileged bidders and allowed them to
submit a new and lower bid.274 Therefore, some bidders, not including the
plaintiff, withdrew their first bid and submitted a second bid. Eventually, a
contractor beat the informationally underprivileged plaintiff and was
awarded the contract with a new lowest bid.275 The plaintiff alleged that the
conduct between the defendants and privileged contractors unreasonably
restrained trade and violated, for example, section 1 of the Sherman Act.276
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.277 The
plaintiff opposed the motion to dismiss mainly by arguing that the bid rigging
scheme in question was a per se violation of the law.278 Eventually, the court
granted the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff did not alleged an
antitrust injury.279 More details of the court’s analysis are presented below.
As elaborated by the Wisconsin court, citing cases like Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat. Inc., to support a civil lawsuit for restraint of trade,
a plaintiff must prove antitrust injury – the type of injury antitrust laws were
intended to prevent.280 More specifically, an antitrust injury is a plaintiff’s
loss that flows from the competition-reducing aspect of the defendant’s
conduct.281 This means that a plaintiff needs to link its losses to a defendant’s
conduct that reduces output or increases prices to consumers, instead of only
to the plaintiff itself.282 Therefore, if a defendant’s conduct increased
competition (i.e., was not anti-competitive conduct) and constituted a loss to
269.
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282.

Id. at 1044.
Id.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1045-46.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1046.
Id.
Id. at 1047.

2018]

DEFINING AND REGULATING HARDCORE CARTELS

973

a plaintiff, such loss would not be viewed as an antitrust injury by a court.283
This is exactly why courts believe that antitrust law is “the protection of
competition, not competitors.”284
Indeed, the plaintiff in our Wisconsin case suffered an injury because it
was not awarded the renovation contract in light of the improper vertical bid
rigging scheme. However, such injury was not an antitrust injury because
the court did not view the vertical bid rigging scheme as anti-competitive
conduct. Instead, the scheme was considered by the court as one that
increased competition since privileged contractors were allowed to submit a
new bid resulting in a lower procurement price to the defendants.285
In response to the plaintiff’s claim that the bid rigging scheme in
question was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, the court
rejected the claim mainly for two reasons. First, the court held that the
existence of a per se violation without antitrust injury was not sufficient for
the plaintiff to recover damages in a civil action.286 In other words, the court
meant that even if conduct was classified by the previous court as a per se
violation, the plaintiff must still show antitrust injury. Second, the court
distinguished between horizontal bid rigging and vertical bid rigging. The
court noted that United States v. Portsmouth Paving Corp., cited by the
plaintiff, involved a bid rigging agreement formed between competitors (i.e.,
horizontal bid rigging).287 In contrast, the current case involved bid rigging
schemes formed between purchasers and suppliers (i.e., vertical bid
rigging).288 The court highlighted defendants’ right to favor and switch
suppliers and stressed that exercising such right did not violate the Sherman
Act.289 The court did acknowledge the improperness of the vertical scheme
in question, but it also noted that there were other laws, such as unfair
competition law and business tort law, which could provide remedies to
companies that encountered improper business conduct.290 From the court’s
analysis, we could see that the court did not agree with the plaintiff that the
bid rigging scheme in question was a per se violation.
Although not mentioned by the court, we could infer from the court’s
analysis that vertical bid rigging should not be classified as a per se illegal
category. Moreover, when analyzed under the reasonableness test, vertical
bid rigging should not be considered as an unreasonable restraint of trade.
This is because, when conducting the antitrust injury analysis, the court
283.
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clearly held that vertical bid rigging, at least the one in question, has a procompetitive effect but no anti-competitive effect. Therefore, it would not fit
into the per se illegal category that represents conduct that almost always
involves anti-competitive effects and no pro-competitive effects. In
addition, vertical bid rigging would survive a RoR test that weighs the anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects of a conduct. This is because
vertical bid rigging that has a pro-competitive effect, but no anti-competitive
effect, generates a net pro-competitive effect. Therefore, the author suggests
that vertical bid rigging is the least harmful among the four vertical
agreements included in Hong Kong’s definition of “serious anti-competitive
conduct,” and it should be removed from such definition.
E. Divergence Justified or Not?
Overall, U.S. courts’ attitude towards price fixing, output restriction,
market allocation and bid rigging agreements formed vertically is strikingly
different from that towards the same four agreements formed horizontally.
As demonstrated in Section I of this Comment, U.S. courts classified the four
agreements formed between competitors as per se illegal. Courts did so
because, through judicial experience, they were confident that these
agreements almost always generate a net anti-competitive effect. In contrast,
U.S. courts applied the RoR, which is more lenient to defendants, to examine
the same agreements formed vertically. This reflects that courts are not sure
if these vertical agreements always unreasonably restrain competition. The
results of the four vertical cases also reflect that it is possible for these
vertical agreements to survive the RoR examination. Most importantly,
these decisions show that some vertical agreements are not only free from
anti-competitive effect at all, but also create a net, if not pure, procompetitive effect. Recall the question raised at the beginning of this
section: are vertical price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and
bid rigging all included in the definition of “serious anti-competitive
conduct” created by Hong Kong legislators but not in the definition of
“hardcore cartels” created by OECD, indeed more severe violations of
antitrust law? Based on the analysis presented in this Section, the answer is
clearly negative. So, what are the implications for Hong Kong?
As explained in Section II of this Comment, the label of “serious anticompetitive conduct” has a strong signaling effect to the general public in
Hong Kong. Even a layman who has never studied antitrust law could easily
understand the harmful nature of the conduct covered under the term.
Companies, after reading section two of the Ordinance, which includes the
definition of serious anti-competitive conduct, would easily be discouraged
from entering into any of the conduct enumerated, including the four vertical
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agreements in question. In addition, “serious anti-competitive conduct” is
more than just a label as it entails real legal consequences. As described,
also in Section II of this Comment, Hong Kong’s Ordinance adopted a dualtrack system which provides relatively harsher procedures to “serious anticompetitive conduct” compared to all other anti-competitive agreements that
are prohibited by the First Conduct Rule.291 First, if several small
corporations form one of the four vertical agreements and the combination
is not too big, they could not enjoy the “agreement of lesser significance”
exclusion.292 This means that these small corporations need to worry if the
vertical agreement has violated the First Conduct Rule. Second, the harsher
commitment system, Infringement Notice system, applies to “serious anticompetitive conducts.”293 Under such a system, a second chance from the
law enforcement agency is not guaranteed to corporations suspected of
engaging in any of the four vertical agreements. Also, these suspected
corporations may need to make commitments beyond stopping their illegal
conduct forever, such as refraining from any specified conduct, taking any
specified action and/or admitting to illegal conduct. Knowing these
discriminating and harsher legal consequences, corporations would be
discouraged from the outset to participate in the four vertical agreements
which may not be anti-competitive. There are two ways a company could
learn these consequences, either by studying the Ordinance or through public
examples. Such discouragement is undesirable because these non-anticompetitive conducts could be productive to the economy (i.e. contribute to
the Gross Domestic Product of Hong Kong). Not to mention that some of
the vertical agreements may be pro-competitive. They should be
encouraged, rather than discouraged.
Indeed, the dual-track system was designed to discourage certain
agreements - “serious anti-competitive conduct.” Yet, as the title of the
terminology and legislation history has suggested, such discrimination is
based on the belief that some conduct is more serious than others. However,
as demonstrated in this Section, the four agreements formed vertically are
far less severe than those formed horizontally. Therefore, it is unjustified to
apply harsher procedures to vertical agreements on par with “hardcore
cartels.” Nor is it justifiable to discourage companies from engaging in these
vertical conducts since they do have the potential to create a net procompetitive effect and benefit Hong Kong’s economy.
Last, but not least, there is the problem related to enforcement resources
allocation. Ideally, it would be great if the agency could strike down all anticompetitive conducts. However, in reality, this is impossible as the agency
291. Supra Section II(B).
292. Supra Section II(B)(1).
293. Supra Section II(B)(2).
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has limited resources in combating anti-competitive effects. This means that,
for the good of society, the agency must use its resources wisely, by
allocating its resources to fight against the most harmful conducts. It is
because this could generate the highest return to society. However, what is
the most harmful conduct? If the agency fully endorses the legislators, it
would think the most harmful conduct is “serious anti-competitive conduct”
as defined in the Ordinance. Then, it would treat all four types of conduct,
whether formed horizontally or vertically, equally and pay its attention to
them evenly. Yet, as explained, the four vertical agreements are less
harmful. This means enforcement resources are not allocated to their best
use, causing inefficiency to society.
In short, the above suggests that, first, the four vertical agreements
included as “serious anti-competitive conduct” by Hong Kong legislators are
not as harmful as hard-core cartels. Hence, it is unjust to treat these vertical
agreements equally harshly as hard-core cartels under the Ordinance.
Moreover, the divergence is undesirable to Hong Kong as it would not only
over-discourage the formation of vertical agreements that could be
constructive to the region but may also guide the agency to allocate
enforcement resources inefficiently. Therefore, the author suggests that
Hong Kong legislators should not have diverged from international standards
and categorized the four vertical agreements, together with hard-core cartels,
as “serious anti-competitive conduct” under Hong Kong’s competition law.
IV.

RECONCILIATION: “THE FOUR DON’TS”/”CARTEL CONDUCT”
FORMED OFF THE ORDINANCE BY HK LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY

After a competition law was passed by legislators, it would be enforced
by a statutory agency. In Hong Kong, as introduced, this agency is named
the Competition Commission (HKCC).294 Although the HKCC’s power is
given by Hong Kong’s legislators and bound by the Competition Ordinance,
the agency does possess some discretionary power in delivering its duties.295
Such power enables the agency to exercise its own will based on its expertise
and understanding of competition law. For example, after reading the
definition of “serious anti-competitive conduct,” it could decide whether to
fully endorse with the legislators and, when it has a choice, treat the four
agreements formed vertically as harshly as those formed horizontally.
Therefore, by observing what the agency has done subsequent to the passage
of the Ordinance, one could understand what the agency’s attitude is towards
294. See COMPETITION ORDINANCE, (2015) Cap. 619 ,110, §129 (H.K.).
295. Id. at §131.
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the divergence formed. For example, if the agency shares the legislators’
view on this matter, the agency should widely adopt and apply the term
“serious anti-competitive conduct.” However, this has not been the case in
reality. In fact, the agency did not utilize the term created by the legislators
but created two new terms off the statute: “the Four Don’ts” and “Cartel
Conduct,” whose definitions are distinct from “serious anti-competitive
conduct.”
A. The Four Don’ts
One of the functions given to the HKCC by the Ordinance is “to
promote public understanding of the value of competition and how this
Ordinance promotes competition.”296 Therefore, soon after the Ordinance
was passed, the HKCC decided to issue publications as educational tools
which would be “in line with international best practices” to provide
guidance for businesses to comply with the law.297 In December 2014, the
HKCC published a brochure titled Competition Ordinance and SMEs.298
This is one of the very first publications issued by the HKCC.299 It came
even before significant publications like the six guidelines and two
policies.300 The brochure aimed at helping SMEs to learn their rights and
duties under the law in an easy-to-understand approach.301 To do so, the
HKCC created a term “The Four Don’ts” and emphasized that SMEs should
never engage in the conducts covered under such term.302 As the name has
suggested, “The Four Don’ts” are the four things that businesses should not
do. Defined by the HKCC, they are agreements with competitors to fix
prices, restrict output, share markets or rig bids.303 Since the “Four Don’ts”
only cover agreements formed between competitors, this new term
essentially refers to “hard-core cartels” as introduced by the OECD, but not
296. Id. at §130.
297. COMPETITION
COMM’N,
ANNUAL
REPORT
42
(2014)
(H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/2013_14_CC_Annual_Rep
ort.pdf.
298. COMPETITION COMM’N, COMPETITION COMMISSION PUBLISHES “THE COMPETITION
ORDINANCE
AND
SMES”
BROCHURE
(2014)
(H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/SME_brochure_press_release_Eng_20141
230.pdf.
COMM’N,
PRESS
RELEASES
&
ANNOUNCEMENT,
299. COMPETITION
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/press_announce.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
300. Infra Section IV(B).
301. COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 297 .
302. COMPETITION COMM’N, THE COMPETITION ORDINANCE AND SME’S (2014) (H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/CC_SME_Brochure_Eng.p
df.
303. Id. at 4 - 5.
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“serious anti-competitive conducts” as created by Hong Kong legislators.
Why didn’t the HKCC apply the term “serious anti-competitive conduct”
provided in the law and warn businesses not to engage in the four agreements
formed, not only horizontally, but also vertically? One can’t say that it is
because the “Four Don’ts” are easier to understand by businesses than
“serious anti-competitive conduct,” since the meaning of the latter is also
very apparent from the term itself. Instead, the author suggests that it is
because HKCC was truly, as it claimed, “in line with international best
practices” when preparing these publications.304 That is, the HKCC did not
believe that the most severe anti-competitive conducts are anything more
than hardcore cartels and clearly do not include the four vertical agreements.
In the brochure, the agency did express its attitude towards vertical
agreements.305 As it explained, almost all vertical agreements do not harm
competition and violate the competition law in Hong Kong.306 That said, the
HKCC did acknowledge that vertical agreements are not immune from
contravening the law.307 The HKCC highlighted Resale Price Maintenance
as the most alarming vertical agreement.308 Even for this kind of agreement,
the agency stated that it must be considered on a case-by-case basis to see if
it is illegal.309 For example, a Resale Price Maintenance agreement may not
have an objective to harm competition or may have an efficiency
justification.310 This understanding is in line with what we have learned
about vertical price-fixing agreements in Section III of this Comment.
The Ordinance came into full effect in December 2015.311 A month
before that, the HKCC published a practical toolkit titled How to comply with
the Competition Ordinance.312 The toolkit aims at helping businesses,
especially SMEs, to review their conduct and set up an effective compliance
strategy.313 Similar to the brochure published in 2014, this toolkit used the
term “The Four Don’ts” and stressed that businesses should never engage in
the four conducts with competitors.314 The brochure also reiterated that
304. COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 297, at 42.
305. COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 302.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 10.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. COMPETITION COMM’N, COMPETITION ORDINANCE COMES INTO FULL EFFECT TODAY
(2015) (H.K.), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/Competition_Ordinance_
Comes_into_Full_Effect_Today_EN.pdf.
312. COMPETITION COMM’N, COMPETITION COMMISSION PUBLISHES PRACTICAL
COMPLIANCE TOOLKIT FOR SMES (2015) (H.K.), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/
press/files/20151102_PressRel_Toolkit_Eng.pdf.
313. Id.
314. COMPETITION COMM’N, HOW TO COMPLY WITH THE COMPETITION ORDINANCE 4

2018]

DEFINING AND REGULATING HARDCORE CARTELS

979

vertical agreements generally don’t harm competition, except for Resale
Price Maintenance arrangements.315 As one of the key components of the
toolkit, there is a checklist that helps businesses to identify their risk of
violating the law.316 Risks are classified into three levels: high, medium and
low.317 Only “The Four Don’ts” and vertical agreements that impose fixed
or minimum resale prices were labeled as high risk activities.318 Again, why
didn’t the HKCC describe every conduct under “serious anti-competitive
conduct” as high risk? It is clearly because the HKCC did not think that
vertical output restriction, market allocation or bid rigging are as harmful as
other high-risk conduct, and businesses should not be discouraged from
engaging in these activities. In other words, the agency’s choice reflected
that the agency has leaned against the international standard, rather than local
legislators.
The creation of the term “The Four Don’ts” and publications mentioned
above have a long-lasting impact. In the following two years, the HKCC
organized multiple public seminars on the Competition Ordinance to educate
society.319 For example, the author attended one public seminar in person
held on February 1, 2016 in Hong Kong.320 At the seminar, the two
publications introduced above were distributed to the audience. One of the
key messages the agency tried to deliver to the audience was that businesses
should not worry too much as long as they don’t engage in “The Four
Don’ts.” The agency did not tell the audience not to engage in all eight
kinds of “serious anti-competitive conduct,” as defined by the law. From the
event pictures posted on the agency’s webpage, one could see that the
publications have continued to be used in subsequent, and most recent
seminars.321 This means the agency is still using the term “The Four Don’ts”
(2015) (H.K.), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/CC_SME_
Compliance_Toolkit_Eng.pdf.
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id. at 8-9.
317. Id.
318. Id.
COMM’N,
ANNUAL
REPORT
38
(2016)
(H.K.),
319. COMPETITION
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/2015_16_CC_Annual_Rep
ort.pdf;
COMPETITION
COMM’N,
COMPLETED
EVENTS,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/campaigns_events/completed/completed_events.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
320. The author has the confirmation email from the Competition Commission as proof
(on file with the author).
321. From the webpage of the Competition Commission, one could see how the cover of
the two publications look alike.
COMPETITION COMM’N, OTHER PUBLICATIONS,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/other_publications.html
(last
visited May 17, 2018). From the event pictures uploaded by the Competition Commission,
one could see that the two publications were still being used - COMPETITION COMM’N,
SEMINAR
ON
COMPETITION
ORDINANCE
ON
DECEMBER
1,
2017,
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created by itself to communicate and educate the general public.
B. Cartel Conduct
According to Section 35 of the Competition Ordinance, Hong Kong’s
Competition Commission (HKCC), the law enforcement agency of the
Ordinance, must issue guidelines to provide guidance on how the HKCC
intends to interpret and give effect to the Ordinance.322 Following the
Ordinance, in 2015, the HKCC has published six guidelines.323 In addition,
as a supplement to the ordinance and guidelines, the HKCC issued the
Enforcement Policy in November 2015 to announce its plans for its work.324
In the Policy, the HKCC acknowledged that their resources are limited for
investigation and enforcement.325 Therefore, HKCC indicated that it would
exercise its discretion and direct resources to encourage compliance with the
law, especially during the first few years of the operation of the Ordinance.326
More specifically, the HKCC would encourage compliance with the law not
to perform conducts that are “clearly harmful to competition and consumers
in Hong Kong,” through education, engagement and enforcement.327 Here,
the HKCC explicitly stated that it would give priority to investigating cases
involving Cartel Conduct and “other agreements contravening the First
Conduct Rule causing significant harm to competition in Hong Kong.”328
Cartel Conduct is not a term covered by the Ordinance. It was introduced as
an official term in Hong Kong by the HKCC. As defined by the HKCC,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/campaigns_events/completed/completed_events.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2018); COMPETITION COMM’N, SEMINAR ON COMPETITION ORDINANCE ON
AUGUST
24,
2017,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/campaigns_events/seminarsworkshops_20170824.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 7, 2018); COMPETITION COMM’N, SEMINAR ON COMPETITION ORDINANCE
ON
NOVEMBER
23,
2016,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/campaigns_events/seminarsworkshops_20161124.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 7, 2018).
322. COMPETITION ORDINANCE, (2015) Cap. 619 ,110, §135 (H.K.).
323. COMPETITION
COMM’N,
GUIDANCE,
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/guidance.html (last visited
July 11, 2017).
324. COMPETITION COMM’N, COMPETITION COMMISSION PUBLISHES ENFORCEMENT
POLICY AND CARTEL LENIENCY POLICY (2015) (H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/20151119_PressRel_Policy_Documents_E
ng.pdf.
325. COMPETITION COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY 2-3 (2015) (H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Enforcement_Policy_
Eng.pdf.
326. Id. at 3.
327. Id.
328. Id.
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Cartel Conduct, simply speaking, refers to price fixing, market allocation,
output restriction and bid rigging agreements formed between companies “in
competition with each other.”329 In other words, Cartel Conduct shares the
definition of both “The Four Don’ts” created by HKCC itself and “hardcore
cartels” introduced by the OECD, but is different from the “serious anticompetition conduct” created by Hong Kong’s legislators. In contrast, the
HKCC did not provide a definition for its other priority, which is cases
involving, “other agreements contravening the First Conduct Rule causing
significant harm to competition in Hong Kong.”330 However, it seems that
these other agreements do not refer to the four agreements formed vertically.
Otherwise, why would the HKCC not use the more authoritative term
“serious anti-competitive conduct” which was already in the law for both
Cartel Conduct and other agreements? Why did the HKCC not inform the
public that “serious anti-competitive conduct” is most serious, as suggested
by the law, and that it would prioritize combating them? It is clearly because
the HKCC did not share the same view as Hong Kong legislators that the
four vertical agreements are at least as severe as hard-core cartels. When
explaining in the Enforcement Policy why it planned to treat Cartel Conduct
differently, the HKCC stated that, “[c]artels differ from most other forms of
anti-competitive conduct in that they are universally condemned as
economically harmful behavior.”331 This reveals that the agency, not only
realized and acknowledged the existence of an international standard (in
identifying which conducts are more serious), but also defined and
discriminated “Cartel Conduct” based on such a standard.
In the very same month, together with the Enforcement Policy, the
HKCC published the Leniency Policy under section 80 of the Ordinance.332
According to section 80, the HKCC may form a leniency agreement with a
person “that it will not bring or continue proceedings . . . for a pecuniary
penalty in respect of an alleged contravention of a conduct rule against,” in
exchange for the “person’s co-operation in an investigation or in proceedings
under [the] Ordinance.”333 As designed by the HKCC and announced in the
Leniency Policy, the agency would only offer such a forgiving opportunity
to the first whistle-blower that has engaged in “Cartel Conduct.”334 The
definition of “Cartel Conduct” here, is identical to the one introduced in the
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 8.
COMPETITION ORDINANCE, (2015) Cap. 619 ,110, §80 (H.K.).
COMPETITION COMM’N, THE LENIENCY POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS ENGAGED IN
CARTEL
CONDUCT
3
(2015)
(H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Eng.
pdf.

982

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. XX:IV

Enforcement Policy.335 Just to elaborate the policy in a simpler way: several
companies conspired and implemented policies constituting Cartel Conduct.
One of the members of the conspiracy (i.e. the whistle-blower) could turn
itself in to the agency and promise to cooperate with the agency. Then the
member company would become immune to being penalized by the
government for its wrongdoing.336 However, only the first whistle-blower
who successfully made a leniency agreement with the agency could enjoy
such an exemption. Such first-in-the-door requirement was included to
incentivize a member of the conspiracy to be the first to apply for leniency.337
But why did the agency, after exercising its discretion, limit leniency to
“Cartel Conduct”? To make it clear, the author is not challenging the cartelconduct-only requirement itself, as this is nothing new in the field of
antitrust. In fact, the U.S. first introduced a similar policy known as the
Leniency Program back in 1978, and revised it substantially in the early
1990s.338 In the U.S., leniency is only available to an applicant that engaged
in a criminal violation (i.e. horizontal price fixing, output restriction, market
allocation or bid rigging).339 What the question raised really means is: why
did the HKCC abandon the term “serious anti-competitive conduct” offered
by legislators when designing the applicability of the leniency policy? The
following introductory paragraph of the Leniency Policy may shed some
light on the question: “Leniency is a key investigative tool used by
competition authorities around the world to combat cartels. Cartels differ
from other types of anti-competitive conduct. First, they are universally
condemned as economically harmful. Second, cartels are usually organised
and implemented in secret, making them more difficult to detect.”340
From the choice of words like “the world” and “universally,” there is
no doubt that the HKCC realized the existence of an international standard.
That is, hardcore cartels are the most harmful conduct and they should be
treated differently. Moreover, the paragraph shows that the agency
supported the international standard and relied on such a standard when
335. Id. at 4.
336. Id. at 3 (explaining that even so, the whistle-blower is still liable for damages, if any,
to private bodies).
337. Id. at 2.
338. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ANTITRUST
DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS 1 (2017),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/926521/download.
339. Id. at 6; see also, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRICE FIXING, BID RIGGING, AND MARKET
ALLOCATION SCHEMES: WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT TO LOOK FOR 1-3 (2005 ed. 2001),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/810261/download (showing that criminal violations only
refer to certain agreements formed horizontally).
340. COMPETITION COMM’N, THE LENIENCY POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS ENGAGED IN
CARTEL CONDUCT 2 (Nov. 2015) (H.K.), https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_
guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Eng.pdf.
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creating its leniency policy. This also means that the HKCC did not believe
in the legislators that the four vertical agreements are equally harmful and
should be treated especially as hard-core cartels.
C. Why Reconcile?
From the above, one can see that the HKCC did not embrace the term
“serious anti-competitive conduct” as defined by legislators in the ordinance.
Otherwise, why would the agency bother to create its own terms “The Four
Don’ts” and “Cartel Conduct”? If the agency agreed that all eight types of
conduct under “serious anti-competitive conduct” are more harmful, it would
have applied the term and regulated all the eight conducts differently under
its Enforcement Policy and Leniency Policy. In reality, the agency did not
do so, but created terms that have the same definition as hard-core cartels.
This reflects that the agency realized that price fixing, output restriction,
market allocation, or bid rigging agreement, formed vertically, are less
harmful than those formed horizontally. From a broader perspective, this
could be viewed as an attempt by the agency to form its own dual-track
system to reconcile the divergence between international standards and Hong
Kong legislators. The agency’s moves were not without reason. As
discussed, the agency was aware of, and also referenced, the international
standard when creating its terminologies and policies.341 So, why was the
HKCC aware of the international standard and why could it appreciate such
a standard?
First, the agency has expertise in competition law. To understand this,
one could look at the profiles of the management of the HKCC before the
reconciliation started to take place. On April 26, 2013, the Chief Executive
of Hong Kong appointed the first group of fourteen Competition
Commission Members, including a Chairperson.342 These fourteen members
were responsible for supervising the work of the executive arm of the agency
and approving major decisions.343 They were experts from different
professionals or sectors.344 Among these Members, one the author
particularly wants to highlight is Thomas Cheng. At that time, he was an
341. COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 297, at 42; COMPETITION COMM’N, supra
noteError! Bookmark not defined., at 2.
342. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENTS TO COMPETITION COMMISSION (Apr. 26, 2013)
(H.K.), http://www.cedb.gov.hk/citb/en/Pub_Press/Press_Releases/2013/
P201304260200.html.
343. COMPETITION COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 2012/2013 16 (2013) (H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/2012_13_CC_Annual_Rep
ort.pdf.
344. Id. at 8-15.
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Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the University of Hong Kong,
specializing in Antitrust Law.345 He earned law degrees from Harvard Law
School and the University of Oxford.346 Therefore, Professor Cheng, if not
anyone else among the Competition Commission Members, must know the
international standard and probably has shared this knowledge with other
Members. Moving forward, in July 2014, the HKCC appointed its first Chief
Executive Officer Dr. Stanley Wong.347 Dr. Wong, before joining the
HKCC, had almost 30 years of experience practicing Competition Law in
Canada. He was a Member of the Competition Authority in Ireland.348 He
provided advisory services about competition law to agencies and courts
around the world, including the European Commission.349 He also
participated in the work of OECD, the institution that defined hardcore
cartels.350 There is no doubt that he also understands very well the
international standard that hardcore cartels, but nothing more, are accepted
universally as the most severe anti-competitive conducts.
Second, after its establishment and before the reconciliation started to
take place, the HKCC developed and maintained a strong tie with
international competition forums and authorities. This has helped the HKCC
to learn and appreciate international norms in the field of Antitrust. For
example, in December 2013, the agency joined the International Competition
Network (ICN), an international community formed by and for competition
authorities.351 One of INC’s functions was to promote procedural and
substantive benchmarks worldwide.352 Thus, it would not be a surprise if
Hong Kong, as a member of the ICN, has learned and imported some
international standard from there. In addition, the HKCC engaged in
different forms of international exchanges to learn more about the practice
and operation of overseas competition authorities.353 In 2013 and 2014, the
agency met and exchanged ideas with many overseas delegates, such as those
from the Competition Commissions of Singapore, the European
345. Id. at 10.
346. HKU
FACULTY
OF
LAW,
ACADEMIC
STAFF
THOMAS
CHENG,
http://www.law.hku.hk/faculty/staff/cheng_thomas.php (last visited Feb. 7, 2018) (H.K.).
347. COMPETITION COMM’N, COMPETITION COMMISSION ANNOUNCES APPOINTMENT OF
CHIEF
EXECUTIVE
OFFICER
(July
21,
2014)
(H.K.),
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/press_releaseCompetitionCommissionAnn
ouncesAppointmentofChiefExecutiveOfficer.pdf.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id.
COMM’N,
INTERNATIONAL
LIAISON,
351. COMPETITION
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/about/international_liaison/overview.html (last visited Feb. 7,
2018) (H.K.).
352. Id.
353. COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 297, at 35.
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Commission, the Australian Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal,
the Competition Commission of the United Kingdom, the French
Competition Authority and the Belgian Competition Authority.354 These
interactions enabled the HKCC to get a sense of what some of the
consensuses formed among international authorities were.
In short, this Section has revealed the agency’s attempt to reconcile the
divergence between Hong Kong legislators and international standards,
mainly by creating the two terms “The Four Don’ts” and “Cartel Conduct”
and its own dual-track system off the statute accordingly. Moreover, this
Section explained why the agency could appreciate the international
standard. Knowing this is important because it helps us understand the
source of motivation for the agency to implement its reconciliation scheme.
V.

REFLECTIONS

Intuitively, one may ask: Did the HKCC succeed in reconciling the
divergence? To answer this question, one needs to evaluate the effectiveness
and limitations of the reconciliation taken by the HKCC. As explained at the
end of Section III of this Comment, given that the four vertical agreements
are not as harmful as hardcore cartels, it is unjustified to discriminate and
discourage the former by: (1) applying the harsher commitment system,
Infringement Notice system, to the four vertical agreements, (2) not allowing
them to enjoy the “agreement of lesser significance” exclusion and (3)
creating fear among the public that the four vertical agreements are illegal
through the signaling effect of the term “serious anti-competitive conducts”
itself. Moreover, labeled as (4), the divergence may lead the agency to
misallocate its enforcement resources and result in inefficiency to society.355
This would be the four aspects the author used to evaluate the successfulness
of the reconciliation.
Under the current status of the Ordinance and policy of the HKCC, the
reconciliation does have a chance to greatly suppress the dual-track system
created by legislators. What is special about the current status of the
Ordinance? Surprisingly, private enforcement of the Ordinance is limited.
To private individuals, no matter an average person or corporation, the
Ordinance only provides “follow-on” actions to be brought in the
Competition Tribunal.356 According to Section 110 of the Ordinance, private
individuals damaged by anti-competitive conduct could only bring private
actions after (1) the Competition Tribunal determined that there was a
354. Id. at 36-38.
355. Supra Section III(E).
356. COMPETITION COMM’N, supra note 343, at 23; Competition Ordinance, supra note 5,
at Part 7.
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contravention of the Ordinance or (2) the wrongdoer admitted to his or her
contravention in a commitment accepted by the agency.357 In other words, if
a private individual believes that it has suffered a loss due to an anticompetitive conduct, and there is no prior Competition Tribunal conviction
or commitment accepted by the agency, the individual could not initiate a
suit against the wrongdoer in the Competition Tribunal. Under such
circumstance, all the private individual could do is to file a complaint to the
HKCC.358 However, after receiving the complaint, the agency is not required
to conduct an investigation if it thinks that the complaint is unreasonable.359
It is unclear what would constitute “unreasonable.” For example, could the
agency not investigate a complaint involving a vertical output restriction,
market allocation or bid rigging agreement if the agency believes that these
conducts are unlikely to harm competition?360
If the answer is positive, the reconciliation initiated by the agency is
quite efficient in suppressing the divergence created by the legislators. First,
it could screen out complaints that involve the serious anti-competitive
conduct formed vertically and only follows on complaints that involve
hardcore cartels. Yet, this may put the agency in an embarrassing situation
as it has to answer complainants’ questions, such as, “why do you think my
complaint against a vertical market allocation agreement is unreasonable
while the law states that it is a serious anti-competitive conduct?” On the
other hand, the agency could start its own investigation even without any
complaint, as long as the agency has reasonable cause to suspect that there
was, is, or will be a contravention of the Ordinance.361 Relying on the
Enforcement Policy, it is expected that most of the investigation started by
the agency would be against Cartel Conduct. Therefore, with its
discretionary power in deciding what to investigate, the agency could avoid
starting an investigation against the four vertical agreements. For instance,
this prevents inefficiency as a result of misallocation of enforcement
resources. Also, very few, if any, vertical agreements would need to
experience harsher treatments under the dual-track commitment or exclusion
system. Then, from the point of view of businesses engaging in vertical
agreements, they (1) get a sense from the market that the agency is not going
after them vigorously and (2) have little chance to hear the rest sharing
experience of those harsher treatments. Thus, businesses need to worry less
357. Competition Ordinance, supra note 5, at §110.
358. Id. at §37.
359. Id.
360. The author did not list vertical price-fixing agreement as an example because the
agency has stated that minimum resale price agreement has a high risk of violating the
Competition Ordinance.
361. Competition Ordinance, supra note 5, at §39.
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about experiencing the harsher Infringement Notice system and not being
able to enjoy the “agreement of lesser significance” exclusion themselves.
Hence, they would be less discouraged from engaging in the vertical conduct
which may benefit Hong Kong’s economy.
However, what if the agency’s belief that certain conduct is unlikely to
harm competition does not make related complaints “unreasonable”? In
other words, what if the agency could not refuse to investigate a complaint
involving a vertical output restriction, market allocation, or bid rigging
agreement even if the agency believed that the conduct was unlikely to harm
competition? In this case, the agency would be less able to suppress the
problems caused by the dual-track commitment and exclusion systems. It is
because even if the agency does not actively start its own investigation
against the vertical conduct, it still needs to conduct an investigation when it
receives complaints. That said, there are still certain things the agency could
do to uphold its reconciliation. For example, it is possible that after
investigation, the agency has reasonable cause to believe that a vertical
“serious anti-competitive conduct” that violates the First Conduct Rule was
formed. Such conduct could be one formed by several small companies that
failed to enjoy the “agreement of lesser significance” exclusion under the
existing law. In any event, the harsher Infringement Notice system applies.
This means that a second chance is not guaranteed, and the agency may
proceed the case to the Competition Tribunal. The agency could exercise its
discretionary power and choose not to sue the suspected company. Then, the
agency could continue to focus on other cases that involve hardcore cartels.
However, in exchange, the company must commit to complying with
requirements set forth in the Infringement Notice in exchange for the second
chance. As described, these requirements may include, but are not limited
to, refraining from any specified conduct, taking any specified action and/or
admitting to illegal conduct.362 Of course, again, the agency could exercise
its discretionary power to be more lenient to the suspected companies in
terms of the requirements. Nonetheless, making a commitment under such
system, even at the most lenient level, is still undesirable to the suspected
company. Companies would spread their unpleasant experience in the
industry and discourage others from forming vertical agreements. Isn’t this
great? No! This is great only in deterring horizontal agreements as they are
almost always anti-competitive. However, vertical agreements may not be
anti-competitive; society does not want to discourage them as much as
horizontal agreements. In other words, it is fine to penalize companies that
engage in anti-competitive vertical conduct. However, these examples
should not over-discourage the formation of productive and pro-competitive
362. Competition Ordinance, supra note 5, at § 67(3).
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vertical agreements in the market. Therefore, if the agency’s belief that
certain conduct is unlikely to harm competition does not make related
complaints “unreasonable,” the effectiveness of the reconciliation would be
weakened.
From the above, one could see that one major drawback of the
reconciliation is that it relies on the agency’s belief. However, this could be
quite unstable. What if, even worse, the agency changes its mind and
chooses to believe the legislators, rather than the international standard that
the four vertical agreements are as harmful as hardcore cartels? This is not
impossible, given that the agency is controlled by a handful of people like
around fourteen Commission Members and one CEO. All they need to do
to reverse the status quo is to amend its publications, such as brochures and
the two Policies. Then, the agency would abandon using the term “The Four
Don’ts” and tell the public not to engage in all eight conducts under “serious
anti-competitive conducts.”
Moreover, the agency would actively
investigate all of the conduct. As explained, such misallocation of
enforcement resources is ineffective to society. From the businesses’
perspective, participating in the four vertical agreements would have a high
possibility to be investigated, as high as one engaging in hard core cartel
conducts. Companies experiencing the proceedings would complain how
they were not guaranteed a second chance under the Infringement Notice
system or how they were not excluded if the agreement formed was of lesser
significance. As a result, deterrence to form the four vertical agreements,
including those which may have net pro-competitive effects, would be
unpleasantly high.
Optimists may argue that of course the agency (1) could refuse to
investigate conduct that they don’t find likely to be harmful and (2) would
not abandon international standards, and therefore the reconciliation would
remain effective. The author tends to agree on the two premises. However,
such argument failed to take into account that private actions would likely
be expanded in the Ordinance in the future. In the week before the Ordinance
came into full effect in December 2015, the Chairman of the HKCC, Ms.
Anna Wu Hung-yuk, was interviewed by the local media. At the interview,
she agreed that the Ordinance needed to be reviewed in three years and
should consider giving individuals the right to take private actions
independently (i.e. standalone private action).363 This means that this topic
may be brought up for discussion soon in late 2018. Also, this suggestion
may be realized and become part of the law in the foreseeable future. When
363. Jingzhengli Liangloudong Xue Xiaofeizhe Quanyi, The Two Loopholes of the
Competition Ordinance Cut Consumer Rights, [競爭例兩漏洞 削消費者權益], XIRI
TAIYANG
(SUN.ON.CC)
[昔日太陽],
Dec.
7,
2015
(H.K.),
http://thesun.on.cc/cnt/news/20151207/00407_011.html.
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that day comes, the flood gates of private antitrust litigation might be opened.
This has little to do with the dual-track commitment system as it’s triggered
by the agency’s investigation. And the agency still has much control in
deciding whether to investigate suspicious conduct. Yet, the “agreement of
lesser significance” exclusion is out of the agency’s hands. In the past, if the
agency received a complaint involving a vertical serious anti-competitive
conduct formed between small companies, it could give it a second chance
even under the harsher commitment system. While private individuals are
allowed to bring a suit by themselves, these small companies could not enjoy
the exclusion and would need to confront the plaintiffs in the Competition
Tribunal. Since these vertical agreements are usually not anti-competitive,
they do have a good chance to survive in litigation. However, it would cost
the defending companies a lot of time, if not also money in terms of legal
cost, in the litigation. Foreseeing this, companies would be discouraged to
engage in the four vertical agreements which may be productive and procompetitive to the market. As a result, the effectiveness of agency’s
reconciliation would be substantially weakened.
Skeptics could argue there is also a chance that standalone private
actions would never be provided to private individuals. An argument could
be made that proponents would face huge resistance from the SMEs which
prefer less litigation. Indeed, the SMEs are powerful in Hong Kong. As
documented in Section II, both Hong Kong legislators and government had
heavily weighted the voice of SMEs when drafting the law. Let’s assume
the status quo would continue to maintain, which is extremely unlikely, that
is: (1) the agency could refuse to investigate conduct that they don’t find
likely to be harmful, (2) the agency would not abandon the international
standard, and therefore, the reconciliation would remain effective, and (3)
there would be no standalone private action. Even if this came true, there is
one major problem the agency could try to lessen, but never be able to
eliminate. As explained before, the term “serious anti-competitive conducts”
in the statute has a great signaling effect.364 Furthermore, the mismatch
between the substance (i.e. the fact that the four vertical agreements are not
severe conducts) and the signaling effect of the term creates confusion, rather
than legal certainty, to the public. Both the above could easily discourage
companies from engaging in relevant vertical conduct, which may benefit
the economy. Credit should be given to the agency for attempting to
suppress the confusion by avoiding the wide application of the legal term.
However, in order to educate the public in an easy-to-understand way and
form its own dual-track system, the agency had no other option, but to create
two new terms, namely “The Four Don’ts” and “Cartel Conduct.”
364. Supra Section II(A).
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Unfortunately, with more terminologies flowing around in society, legal
certainty was weakened, rather than improved. It is especially true when
these terms do not share the same meaning. With the agency’s hard work in
promoting its own terms, the author does believe that the two terms formed
off the statute are more well-known to businesses. Having said that, a
cautious and timid company is likely to study the statutes, in addition to
merely listening to what the agency says, before preparing its strategy to
comply with the Ordinance. The company may learn from section two of
the Ordinance that the four conducts are considered “serious anticompetitive conducts” no matter if formed horizontally or vertically. This
would definitely discourage the company from engaging in vertical conduct.
Most importantly, when the company is confused by having different terms,
it would tend to rely on the one stated in the statute as it is more authoritative
than the two formed off the statute. Of course, if the company takes further
steps, such as to consult a law firm or the agency, it could find out that the
risk of these vertical activities are actually not as high as hardcore cartels.
Yet, it is costly to the company to figure out the true risk of participating in
the four vertical conducts. Moreover, it is unjust to put this burden on the
company. Instead of discouraging these potential beneficial business
agreements, the Ordinance should encourage them.
So, how could the current system change towards motivating these four
vertical agreements? Looking forward, the author proposes to amend the
definition of “serious anti-competitive conducts” under section two of the
Ordinance. The amendment is simple, but significant. That is, legislators
should limit the definition of “serious anti-competitive conducts” formed
between competitors. This is essentially the same to say that the amended
version of “serious anti-competitive conducts” would only cover hardcore
cartels and exclude the four vertical conducts. First, the dual-track system
would be justified. It is because it correctly reflects the harmfulness of
different conducts and applies the appropriate level of punishment and
deterrence to them accordingly. Second, the amendment could prevent
agency from changing its mind in the future and allocating scarce
enforcement resources to combat less harmful conducts. In other words,
certain stability of competition policy could be ensured and the likelihood of
inefficiency resulting from misallocation of enforcement resources would be
reduced. Third, legal clarity would be improved. It is because although there
may still be three different terms flowing around in the market, companies
would not be confused since they all share the same meaning. In fact, after
legislators amend the law, the agency could consider abandoning the use of
the term “The Four Don’ts” and “Cartel Conduct,” and replacing them by
amendment to “serious anti-competitive conducts.” Sometimes, less is
more. Fourth, after amending the term, the four agreements would be
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encouraged. For instance, the term would no longer send out incorrect
signals that discourage companies from engaging in vertical agreements
which may benefit society. This is simply because only hardcore cartels
would be identified and promoted as the most severe conduct after the legal
term is revised. But why would the vertical agreements be promoted? Put
yourself into the shoes of a company. You are a small company considering
forming a vertical agreement with another company. You know that this is
a profitable plan. However, you are not sure if it’s against the Ordinance. If
the term is amended, you would not hesitate to enter into that agreement. It
is because, first, the agreement has a good chance to be excluded by the law
as an “agreement of lesser significance.” This is something you could
confirm easily by checking yours and your business partners’ aggregate
turnover. If the agreement does count as lesser significance, even if the
general public is given the right to bring standalone private actions in the
future, you would still be immune to violating the Ordinance. Second, if you
are not excluded, you know for sure that a second chance is guaranteed by
the agency. As now, the agreement is no longer a “serious anti-competitive
conducts” and the more lenient Warning Notice system applies. Of course,
you would still worry about standalone private actions. That said, the chance
of being sued by private parties would be lower if the law is amended. That
is because not only would you study the law, but potential plaintiffs would
do so as well. If the definition of “serious anti-competitive conducts” is as
it is now, if standalone private actions are provided, potential plaintiffs
would be more eager to sue under the four vertical conducts. It is because
they have good reason to believe that they could win as you have participated
in so called serious anti-competitive conducts. In contrast, if the law is
amended, potential plaintiffs won’t strongly believe that they have a case and
will hesitate to start a costly legal process.
At the end, to be clear, the author is not arguing that Hong Kong should
not be harsh to vertical anti-competitive conducts. Indeed, although
unlikely, it is possible for vertical agreements to be anti-competitive.
However, what the author is really challenging is: why should these four
vertical agreements be treated as harsh as hardcore cartels? In other words,
if legislators introduce a dual-track system in its competition law, where
should they draw the line between the two tracks? Whether the choice to
draw the line at a particular space is justified? What are the consequences to
society if legislators draw the line in such way? Are these consequences
desirable to society? The author believes that, as demonstrated above, the
proposed version of “serious anti-competitive conducts” could offer Hong
Kong better answers to all these questions than does the existing one.
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CONCLUSION

In 1998, OECD defined hardcore cartels, which includes horizontal
price fixing, output restriction, market allocation and bid rigging, as the most
harmful anti-competitive conducts. Then, this has developed into a standard
widely accepted by international communities. Many countries introduced
a dual-track system in their competition law. Hong Kong was no exception.
It attempted to follow suit when it created its Competition Ordinance, which
was eventually passed in 2012.
However, the dual-track system created by Hong Kong legislators was
imperfect as they added vertical price fixing, output restriction, market
allocation and bid rigging on top of hardcore cartels and defined them all
together as “serious anti-competitive conducts” in the statute. U.S. judicial
experience has shown that the four vertical agreements are not only less
likely to be anti-competitive than hardcore cartels but may also generate procompetitive effects. Even if these agreements have no effect on competition,
they should still be appreciated as they may promote economic growth.
Moreover, the divergence has led to multiple unpleasant consequences. The
major ones are creating legal uncertainties and discouraging businesses to
engage in vertical agreements that have the potential to benefit Hong Kong’s
economy. The above have put the justifiability of the divergence in question.
Subsequently, the local law enforcement agency tried to reconcile the
divergence between Hong Kong legislators and the international standard,
by creating its own dual-track system off the statute. Unfortunately, although
the reconciliation does have some effectiveness in suppressing the adverse
effect of the divergence, the reconciliation was not without limitations. For
example, the reconciliation formed off the statute is less stable and
authoritative. Moreover, it is expected that the Ordinance would expand the
ability of private individuals to bring a competition lawsuit in the
Competition Tribunal in the foreseeable future. These all would bring
uncertainties and challenges to the success of the reconciliation scheme.
Therefore, this Comment suggests that the existing law should be
amended. Specifically, the four vertical agreements should be excluded from
being recognized as “serious anti-competitive conducts” in the statute.
Although this recommendation sounds simple, this Comment demonstrates
how it could effectively fix the existing problems, benefit Hong Kong
immediately, and confront future challenges.

